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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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The following selections from Soviet media on the aftermath of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident and the mobilization of labor and technology in the clean-up effort will be published in the series USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS under the subtitle AFTERMATH OF CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT. This is a representative list of the items selected for that report.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

DEFINING 'NATO STRATEGY' OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 86 pp 47-54

[Article by Lt Gen N. Smorigo: "Psychological Warfare"--A Constituent Part of NATO Strategy"]

[Text] For the nearly 7 decades of our socialist state's existence, international imperialism has tested it for strength by various means: armed aggression, economic blockade, diplomatic boycott. However, history has proven the vital stability of socialism and the unsoundness of attempts by imperialism to destroy it as a socio-political system. Both during the menacing years of civil war and the most difficult period of socialist construction, especially during the harsh times of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against fascist Germany, imperialist reaction was not able to bring us to our knees. We stood up, endured, and prevailed. "Socialism, originally becoming a reality in our country," the CPSU Program (new edition) emphasizes, "has become a world system." Socialism has become firmly established in vast expanses of the earth, and its immeasurable advantages are graphically confirmed by the example of a whole group of countries. The Soviet Union has significantly strengthened its mighty economic, scientific and technical, and defensive potential and improved its international positions. The persistent labor of the Soviet people and major successes in economics, social and political spheres, science, and culture have brought the country of Soviets to new historical boundaries. The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO has overturned the expectations of aggressive circles of imperialism for victory in a world nuclear war.

The realities which have taken shape force imperialism, figuratively speaking, to regroup its forces and resources in the fight against socialism. Needless to say, one should not think that imperialist reaction has renounced war as a forcible means of continuing its adventuristic policy with regard to socialism. At the same time, the imperialists are undertaking desperate attempts to step up and make more fierce the massive ideological attacks on socialism. The class enemy has launched a genuine "psychological war" against us. "We are in a state of war," it states in one of the documents of the NATO military-political leadership. "Of course, it is being waged not with the help of bullets and missiles, but nevertheless it is a war. This is a war of

ideologies, a war of ideas. It demands the same output and selflessness from us as a real war."

Speaking of "psychological war," we should clarify the essence of this concept and determine its relationship with the ideological struggle. The ideological struggle was generated by the objective laws of social development and by the very existence and struggle of classes and also states with a different social system. It is natural that the antagonistic social formations, be they states or classes, also have a different view of the world. Taking shape into a system of political, legal, moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines, these views make up the essence of the ideology of one or another class. The systems of ideas of antagonistic classes, once they have emerged, can no longer get along side by side in terms other than struggle.

Of course it is not the ideas by themselves that struggle, but people and specific personalities armed with a specific world outlook. There is a Marxist-Leninist tenet that ideas become a material force when they are mastered by the masses. Therefore, the basic goal of any class in an ideological struggle is to ensure the influence of its ideas on the broadest masses possible. Striving to achieve this goal inevitably leads to constant ideological confrontation.

Socialism ensures influence of its ideas by spreading Marxist-Leninist doctrine and truthful and objective information about the achievements of the news system in various areas and by using the force of the example of building communism. As the CPSU Program points out, more and more peoples are refusing to trust capitalism, do not want to link the prospects of their development with it, and steadily searching for and finding the path to socialist transformation of their countries.

"Psychological war" is another matter. It is a reflection of the general crisis of the capitalist system in the spiritual sphere. Today's "psychological war" contradicts the objective laws of social development and class struggle in the international arena. It is the abnormal outcome of monopoly bourgeoisie's pathological class hatred of the new world, the world of socialism. It is a diversionary form of imperialism's struggle against the socialist system as a whole, not only against its ideology.

In bourgeois sociology and military science, the concept of "psychological war" is used in the broad and narrow sense. In the broad sense, "psychological war" is identified with the struggle in the spiritual area in general. In this sense this concept is employed only in the context of military theories and military-strategic concepts. Interpreting "psychological war" in the narrow sense is more common--primary influence on the area of social psychology.

Our party proceeds from the methodologically important tenet that ideological struggle must not develop into "psychological war," be used as a means of interfering into the internal affairs of states and peoples, and lead to political or military confrontation.

"The 'psychological war' unleashed by imperialism," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said in a report at the 27th CPSU Congress, "cannot be qualified as anything other than a special form of aggression and information imperialism trampling on the sovereignty, history, and culture of peoples. This is also straightforward political and psychological preparation for war having nothing in common, naturally, with the confrontation of views or with the freedom of exchange of ideas about which they farce in the West. The actions cannot be regarded any other way when people are taught to view any society objectionable to imperialism through the notch in a sight."

We are dealing with an experienced class enemy, whose political experience is diverse and is measured in centuries. It has created a gigantic mass propaganda machine equipped with modern equipment and having at its disposal a staff of disciplined people who hate socialism.

The aggravation of the ideological struggle and increased fierceness of the "psychological war" of imperialism, unprecedented in the entire postwar period, are realities of the military-political situation in the world during the 1980's. What are the causes of this phenomenon?

On the one hand, the achievements of socialism, the increase in the prestige and influence of the world communist and working-class movement, the progressive development of countries which have shaken the yoke of colonial oppression, the rise of the national liberation struggle, and the enormous scope of massive democratic antiwar movements have a profound effect on the consciousness of peoples, increasingly winning their sympathies over to the side of peace and social progress. This evokes an ugly reaction from imperialism which, as is emphasized in the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress, is stubbornly resisting social progress and undertaking attempts to turn back the course of history, undermine the positions of socialism, and take social revenge on a worldwide scale.

On the other hand, a reason for stepping up the "psychological war" is the defeats of imperialism both on the fronts of world politics and in its own rear. The NATO ruling circles are using propaganda noise about "inevitable confrontation" to try to distract public opinion away from the deepening overall crisis of capitalism, the further aggravation of social contradictions, the rise in unemployment and poverty, violence of racism, and open neo-fascism. Bourgeois ideologues strive to compensate for capitalism's lack of a positive ideal with importunate publicity about the pseudo-values of the bourgeois world.

Distinguishing features of the "psychological war" include:

Firstly, its global scale, that is, spreading the "psychological war" to socialist, liberated, and other states and their armed forces; secondly, its total nature, penetrating into all spheres of activities of states and people: politics, economics, diplomacy, and the sphere of scientific and cultural exchange; thirdly, the widespread use of science and technology in the interests of the "psychological war," primarily modern mass information and propaganda media; fourthly, the availability of an extensive, coordinated, and

generously financed "psychological warfare" apparatus; fifthly, raising "psychological warfare" to the rank of state policy.

The strategic goal of imperialism in the "psychological war" against the world of socialism--to help to overthrow the existing system in Eastern Europe and establish there a political regime patterned after the U.S. government--remains unchanged. In carrying out tactical tasks, imperialist centers of the "psychological war" strive to conduct subversive propaganda that is aimed, taking into account the specific characteristics of the audience at which this propaganda is directed. Thus, for example, appealing to the working class of socialist states, ideological saboteurs provoke them into demonstrating "proletarian solidarity" with the workers of capitalist countries by participating in so-called "peaceful strikes." In propaganda aimed at the intelligentsia, the subversive centers of imperialism exaggerate in different variations the thesis that under conditions of "party dictatorship" the talents of intellectuals are suppressed and that true "freedom of creativity" is possible only in the West. The aim of the imperialist "well-wishers" from this psychology is widely known.

The subversive hostile propaganda does not overlook Soviet Armed Forces personnel. Thus, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe set aside up to 15 percent of their broadcasting time for broadcasts specially oriented towards our military audience. In the broadcasts the class enemy obtrusively tries to distort the social nature and historical mission of socialist armies and the role of communist and workers' parties in guiding them and tries in every possible way to slander and falsify the fulfillment of international duty by Soviet soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

In the early 1980's, the American Rand Corporation prepared a "study" of the USSR Armed Forces for the Pentagon. It contained recommendations aimed at weakening the fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers by setting the rank and file against their commanders and arousing nationalistic moods among service members.

Imperialism has chosen Soviet youth as the main target of the "psychological war." As is noted in one of NATO's governing documents, "special attention today should be given to young people who do not possess life experience and are very receptive to everything new, unusual, colorful, and garish in a material and technical respect. Our task is to entice the young people with the ideas of the West." They are pursuing an insidious goal--to weaken the revolutionary enthusiasm of young people, to instill in them an indifference to politics, emotional passiveness, indifference to the historical destinies of socialism, individualism, and consumption, and to deaden class awareness.

The organizers of the "political warfare" intentionally make the subversive propaganda aimed at the young people imaginatively apolitical, select "neutral" topics which are seemingly of universal interest, and provide materials unobtrusively and in a balanced manner. In so doing, they count on entertaining themes: amateur radio operation, stamp collecting, technology, and of course Western music, which Voice of America called "a political doctrine capable of causing an intellectual crack in the communist concrete." Consumer goods exported by the West with an ideological "load" serve this same

goal: T-shirts and paper bags with appropriate inscriptions and pictures, clothing that is clearly military with the label "U.S. Army" on the chest, Zionist and clerical symbols, and so forth.

The views of the NATO military-political leadership toward the direction and content of the "psychological war" against socialist countries and their armed forces are formulated in a number of directive documents developed by the headquarters of the bloc armies. For example, "A Study on Questions of East-West Relations," "Ideological and Moral Aspects of Defense," "Principles of Planning and Conducting a Psychological War," and others. Taking into account the national nature of the armed forces included in the NATO bloc as well as their mission, the questions concerning the content of "psychological war" are spelled out in appropriate manuals and regulations both for the period of aggravation of the situation and for the period of conducting combat operations.

In summarized form, the basic "theses" of subversive propaganda have an absolutely distinct anti-Soviet and anti-communist direction. These "theses" boil down to the following: to convince armed forces personnel of the enemy that their leadership is responsible for aggravating the international situation and unleashing war; publicize the might of NATO and its "defensive" nature and the general goals of the struggle of this bloc's member-countries; portray the soldiers of socialist armies as deceived masses and convince them that they are being used for someone else's interests; evoke in them fear for their destiny and the destiny of relatives; cite the purpose of the war as restoring justice, avoiding forecasts of the future system of the state.

A huge propaganda machine is used in NATO countries for waging the "psychological war." If you take the United States, there at the cabinet level a special group has been created for planning and coordinating the "psychological war" under the direction of the assistant to the president for national security. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), to which the official state radio station Voice of America is subordinate, acts as a sort of citadel of subversive propaganda. Radio stations such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which are actually servants of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, hide under the "roofs" of "public" stations. The American spy department itself makes wide use of both overt and covert avenues of influencing public opinion with disinformation. By admission of a former American intelligence agent, P. Agee, there are more than 22 newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and other mass media being completely or partially financed and controlled by the CIA. It allocates about \$300 million annually for subversive propaganda and has approximately 2,000 employees for this. In all, according to foreign press data, 20,000 people work in the U.S. "psychological warfare" apparatus, for whose work \$2.5 billion is spent annually.

The Pentagon's formations for conducting strategic and tactical "psychological warfare" should also be mentioned. Strategic "psychological warfare" forces are envisioned to be used, as a rule, in a specific theater of military operations. Their functions include conducting psychological operations, prisoner interrogation, and work among the local populace. Tactical subunits

may be used in the interests of the U.S. Army or detached to formations and units of NATO troops.

Let us note that the "psychological warfare" agencies of the armed forces of the US, the FRG, Great Britain, and a number of other NATO countries participate in subversive ideological actions in aggravating the situation in one or another region and in regional conflicts. In particular, during the events in Czechoslovakia (1968), specialists from "psychological warfare" subunits of the US and the FRG penetrated into this country's territory under the guise of "tourists." They collected information of a military-political nature and "adjusted" the broadcasts of more than 80 subversive Western radio stations operating against socialist Czechoslovakia during that period.

Another example. After institution of martial law in Poland, NATO "psychological warfare" services stepped up their subversive activities sharply. The spread rumors that 100,000 (!) Soviet soldiers dressed in Polish uniforms had been dropped into Poland, and were the ones who had allegedly established martial law there. Ten thousand balloons with plastic containers filled with anti-Soviet leaflets and instructions were launched from Bornholm Island towards the Polish People's Republic.

One variation of the "classic" use of tactical "psychological warfare" means was cynically demonstrated during U.S. aggression against Grenada. Prior to the invasion of the island, reports were transmitted from American ships that "the Russians were preparing to land" there. After this, unmarked aircraft appeared in the skies. When the situation was heated up to the limit, the American invaders occupied Grenada under the guise of "liberators." Incidentally, a psychological operations battalion operated in the first echelon of the interventionists. Its personnel immediately began brainwashing the local populace and especially the Cuban specialists captured, trying to get them to refuse to return to their homeland. However, the methods of the American poisoners of souls did not work: not a single Cuban became a traitor.

In addition to the national subversive propaganda machinery within the framework of military-political blocs created and controlled by Washington, there also exist national "psychological warfare" agencies disguised by various "neutral" names.

Subversive press publications are a traditional means of waging "psychological warfare." "Psychological warfare" organs of the NATO Combined Armed Forces are capable of publishing millions of copies of leaflets in a day which they plan to distribute among the population of socialist countries and personnel of their armies in the event of a military conflict. But in peacetime the ideological saboteurs also try to force through hundreds of thousands of copies of anti-Soviet literature into the USSR for distribution among the young people, believers, and other population groups.

Provocative printed propaganda is actively conducted against the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The CIA and the white-emigre pro-fascist organization NTS distribute leaflets on the territory of Afghanistan in which, posing as "friends," they suggest that Soviet servicemen violate

their military duty and help the enemy. A so-called "closed sector" of NTS concocts and sends to the USSR "letters" on behalf of soldiers serving in the DRA. In these "letters" they set false rumors and sow various fabrications on behalf of the alleged "eyewitnesses themselves." What is more, the prison printing house in the city of Mannheim (FRG), as the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT recently reported, a counterfeit edition of the USSR Ministry of Defense organ KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was published and the entire printing forwarded through the U.S. air base at Frankfurt on the Main to Pakistan for subsequent distribution among the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Television occupies an important place among imperialist "psychological warfare" means. The subversive centers of the West use anti-Soviet television broadcasts to try to "shoot through" border areas of our country. To increase the zone of television aggression, the ideological saboteurs are hatching plans for widespread use of the latest technology, earth satellites, avoiding national relay equipment. Presently the television program service of the USIA is being reorganized. A department of television propaganda for foreign countries began functioning in 1983.

Radio remains the main instrument of "psychological warfare." Organizers of radio sabotage from NATO are guided by the "will" of a Hitler protege General Gelen, who cynically asserted: "A pinch of potassium cyanide thrown in a well can poison all the inhabitants of a village; a well-devised lie transmitted over radio can poison millions."

That is precisely why the NATO military-political leadership continues to devote the greatest attention to expanding propaganda intervention on the air. In the first half of the 1980's, in the main capitalist countries alone more than 60 major radio stations were "working" on the socialist countries, with a total broadcasting time of 450 hours per day, including some 40 stations broadcasting to the USSR for about 240 hours per day. Beginning in the early 1980's there has been a trend noted: Major foreign radio stations are reducing their broadcasting to other countries and increasing the amount of it to the USSR.

As for American foreign political propaganda, subversive anti-socialist material makes up three-fourths of it. In 5 years, the number of religious broadcasts to our country has increased by 60 percent. The imperialists are carrying out a broad modernization of the technical base of radio sabotage for the purpose of further intensifying subversive propaganda.

The NATO military-political leadership takes into account the great importance of technical channels--press, radio, television, and others--for conducting subversive propaganda. At the same time, it is improving the techniques and methods of presenting the material. In view of the detrimental nature of the very concept of "psychological warfare," composition of the techniques used in it is extremely limited and can arbitrarily be put into three groups: hidden breach of the laws of logic; psychological pressure; imperceptible emotion.

Hidden breach of the laws of logic enables the ideological saboteurs to mask an obvious falsehood and slander with the appearance of reasonable proof. For example, breaking the logic law of noncontradiction, Washington propagandists,

including U.S. statesmen, hypocritically speak at length about their struggle to strengthen peace, but in fact are preparing for war. One of the philosophical postulates of imperialism in great vogue is a glaring contradiction: "If you want peace, you prepare for war." This group of techniques includes substitution of a thesis in the process of proving something, when noise regarding insignificant and secondary facts is substituted for serious talk about important problems.

Bourgeois propagandists also widely use the technique of logical juggling of the facts where, instead of using the sum total of the arguments for proving a certain thesis, they take only those favorable to them and keep quiet about the rest. It is precisely this technique that is at the basis of the American pamphlet "Soviet Military Power." Against a background of colorful illustrations, this false document describes the USSR weapons, but either does not mention or distorts data about the tremendous U.S. weapons.

The hidden breach of laws of logic group also includes other techniques: juggling of the facts and false summarization, when individual phenomena are passed off as common and typical. In addition to these, the ideological saboteurs widely use techniques directed most likely at the sphere of feelings and emotions, not to the intellect. Psychological pressure serves as the primary mechanism here.

The most massive means of manipulating the psyche is spreading bourgeois propaganda of false stereotypes, i.e., distorted realities, spreading various myths, and attaching labels. For characteristics of socialism and its policies, the "psychological warfare" strategists use, for example, stereotypes with a negative connotation: "iron curtain," "the hand of Moscow," and "the Soviet military threat." But so-called "sparkling generalities" are used to propagandize capitalism, evoking positive emotions: "the Free World," "equal opportunities," "American democracy," and so forth.

This group of techniques also included the method of repeated repetition, reference to authorities, playing to the common people, as well as "shuffling the cards," that is, undisguised disinformation, half-truth, falsification, and others.

Finally, there exist techniques of imperceptible emotion--veiling influence on the minds and souls of people. In the opinion of "psychological warfare" "experts," anecdotes and rumors are the most effective means of forcing through bourgeois views. In one of the American regulations on conducting "psychological warfare" it is written: "Outwardly, rumors do not have the appearance of propaganda and bear no official nature, but are assimilated by many people. The main thing is that they are very difficult to disprove. Having started a rumor, one can figure that within the next few days there will appear hundreds of unintentional helpers spreading it." That is why even in peacetime the U.S. Defense Department has a special department in operation whose workers are engaged in one single task--they make up anecdotes and rumors intended for spreading among the population of the Soviet Union. The purpose of the anecdotes on political and national topics is to discredit, ridicule, indirectly or directly discredit what is dear to the Soviet people, and deprive young people of communist ideals. Spreading anecdotes and rumors

is result of the ideological immaturity and political naivete of individual citizens who unintentionally help the ideological saboteurs of imperialism.

As we can see, the class enemies of socialism, having unleashed a "psychological war," are seeking by various means, through direct and veiled bourgeois influence, to have a corrupting influence on the consciousness of Soviet people and soldiers of our armed forces. The sharpness of the confrontation of the two world views in the international arena, reflecting the contrast of the two world systems of socialism and capitalism, has extraordinarily increased in recent times. By virtue of this, the need to intensify the struggle against bourgeois ideology and instill in soldiers of the Army and Navy high political awareness and the ability to assess social phenomena from distinct class positions and to uphold the ideals and spiritual values of the socialist society.

This is a program requirement of our party. It must permeate all ideological activities of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations called upon to organize active opposition to imperialism's "psychological warfare." This presumes a set of measures of an ideological, moral and psychological, and organizational and technical nature, the interaction of which is able to neutralize the corrupting influence of the enemy's subversive propaganda and ensure maintaining the high combat potential of Soviet soldiers necessary for successful fulfillment of the tasks facing them.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

DIVISION OVERWHELMED BY PAPER WORK, RED TAPE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Col A. Aleksandrov, chief of division political department, delegate to 27th CPSU Congress, under "Reorientation: The Party Member's Position" rubric: "From a Paper Prison"]

[Text] I honestly admit that before my presentation at the Group of Forces party conference I thought my calculations on the abundance of all kinds of "incoming," "outgoing" and other papers would astound the delegates. Judge for yourselves: in 10 months of last year, the political department received 400 messages alone and prepared at least one or two reports a day "upward." The division staff in turn sent up to 1,200 various papers to the regiments and the political department added its 230. Units had to "digest" four papers a day, but this is according to formal arithmetic, with an example of two operations: $(1,200+230) \times 365$ equals approximately 4. And if we discard days off and the days when regimental leaders are at conferences with us in the division or higher (at least two a month), then it turns out that on the days when the commander is in his place he is given at least about ten papers. There is probably no time to read them, and when are they to be fulfilled?

My figures didn't astound anyone, because they were even more "substantial" for others. During a break an air regiment commander came up to me and showed calculations made not by him, but by a Moscow commission: in a year the regiment received 4152 documents, each of which recommended carrying out 3-4 measures. That meant fifty measures per day, but that was only if what was recommended was carried out. If nothing managed to be done on one of those days, that meant tomorrow you already would be required to carry out a hundred measures.

The military council member, chief of the Group of Forces aviation political department came up to us then. He also added his arguments:

"Last year there were 145 commissions working in Group aviation. It is understandable that the unit's usual rhythm already is being interrupted, but they left many of their papers and directions."

We heaved a sigh--this is where our efforts were going--and then exchanged understanding glances as if to say: What can we do? We aren't given to solve this problem. It all depends on the "higher-ups."

Later, listening to presentations by delegates at the party congress who cited similar calculations, I couldn't get rid of the thought that it wasn't simply the "higher-ups" who were at fault here; everyone is a little to blame, each person does his bit. Why? I believe because that style has been established and has not been condemned. No one is about to deny either the rightfulness or the benefit of a plan, a conference, or a directive document. It is bad, however, if all this assumes a self-sufficing significance; if a paper is used to depict activeness, enthusiasm and efficiency; and if we hope that, having dispatched an instruction, everything already has been decided.

We now are aimed toward a reorientation of work style. I am sure that cutting back the quantity of paperwork and breaking out of the paper prison is one of the directions of the reorientation.

The question naturally arises about how to dam the path of the paper flood. As a matter of fact, much here depends on the higher levels, where people surely also are pondering this problem. One would like them to resolve it more efficiently and boldly.

Before departing for the party congress I drew up a solid work schedule for myself. I had to lay the groundwork, so to speak, for a two-week absence. I would come to work early; nevertheless, hardly had I crossed the threshold of the headquarters when the duty officer would hand me telephone messages (someone generates papers even at night). The last of them was very typical: "Personally check the guard, pigsty, and boiler room." But I had done that literally yesterday. What kind of political department chief would await directions for all kinds of commonplace matters? For some reason the "higher-ups" know better what I must do today. Why such petty coddling?

There was another telephone message not long before that: "Personally check the departure of vehicles and order in the motor pools." We sent reports, but it turns out they weren't entirely satisfactory. An additional query followed: "How many vehicles and trip tickets did the political department chief check personally?" I report that I had checked so many. Later I found out that our motor vehicle inspectorate already had provided information about all this.

An analysis of incoming paperwork shows that many papers duplicate each other, our functional duties, and instructions which already had been given, for example, at a conference.

The paper style not only dissipates forces and takes up a huge amount of time; it frequently also is degrading. It also loosens the soil for bureaucratism and chicanery. Now and then one compiler of papers will give a reminder: "I didn't put your name in a summary (or report)" (as if to say: Do you sense the import?) For example, reports often state: "This deficiency also is inherent in other comrades." But it could be: "This deficiency also is inherent in Comrade Aleksandrov." But he "didn't put it in," and therefore

reciprocal consideration is due from Aleksandrov. All this is in full view. Before you know it, a captain who commanded a company envies a captain who writes papers and he requests staff work.

In short, the time has come to arrive at rational solutions here as well, to reject a certain portion of paperwork (for example, the authorized propagandist draws up from twenty to thirty plans of all kinds), and to simplify and combine some documentation. But, I repeat, we have to do more live work with people. It is true, and it must be honestly admitted, that habits hold on tenaciously. Although here in the political department we try to move this matter off dead center in some way, we still have not made a radical breakthrough, but we must strive for it. We will try in the very near future to cut the amount of paperwork in half.

It was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress that today specific actions are the most important thing. Real forward progress must be made at every level. With respect to the problems I am discussing, here too there are opportunities for positive changes. For example, now before sending any paperwork to units and subunits, we stop to think: Could we get by without it? Could the problem be solved by specific organizational work on the spot? In this connection, political department personnel have begun to spend more time among people.

Another way is not to blindly run off written instructions, guidelines [oriyentirovka] and so on, and not to send them down uncritically, but systematize and choose the optimal solution variants. Lt Col E. Mayatskiy introduced many suggestions of benefit to us in this regard.

He admits that "it is our good fortune that, having sent a paper, the authors themselves forget about it, or else we would get it good."

Of course, we too also displayed similar forgetfulness. In short, this is also proof that the paper flow must be halted.

One other way to do this is to change the nature of inspections in units and subunits. To what have we become accustomed? To judge the work from records of proceedings, plans and texts of lectures prepared by non-T/O&E propagandists. How many unnecessary forms, tables and accounting documents have been introduced in the regiments, battalions and even companies for this reason! Traditional plans contain a large number of points "for soundness" or, more correctly, for the inspectors. People are incapable of fulfilling many of these points, but the effort was spent on drawing them up and people were diverted from combat training. A saying has even originated to the effect that if you wish to look well, find yourself good clerks.

Work must be evaluated for the work itself and for its effect on the personnel. We must wean ourselves and wean others from being carried away with bureaucratic methods. We must be guided by criteria of businesslike efficiency in evaluating people.

Here is an episode which gives rise to reflection. Lt Col S. Nuzhin, former commander of a foremost regiment, assumed the position of deputy division

commander. He immediately began to get carried away with paperwork in the sincere belief that the new position demanded this. There were dozens of written instructions and telephone messages: "urgently," "I demand," "I direct attention." Whom will you stir up in this way?

"Sergey Aleksandrovich," the division commander and I told him, "this won't produce results. Work with the people as you did in the regiment."

He heeded the advice. Wits even joked when a difficult task was at hand: "Nuzhin is needed [nuzhen] here." He himself later thanked us: "Thank you for digging me out of the paper pile." The person showed his very best side, and the division commander and I recommended that he be sent to study at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov.

There are positive examples of the campaign against paperpushing, but unfortunately there are more negative examples for now.

The phone rang in my apartment at 0530 hours: there was a fire in Regiment "X" and a vehicle had been sent for me. I ran out and hurried to the regiment, where they put out the fire. The people functioned magnificently and I thanked everyone. I was just making ready to depart when I saw Lt Col P. Drozhzhin, a regimental party member/leader, coming. "Was I needed here?" he asked, and then headed for headquarters. Just what was this? The person had become accustomed to the fact that a telephone message would be sent from above to say when he is to inspect the guard, when to inspect the motor pools, and when to put out a fire.

I would like to mention one other detail. We in the political department nevertheless introduced one paper "sheet" for the sake of eradicating paperwork: we count how many documents were created, and if we see that we are exceeding reasonable limits we sound the alarm, so to speak.

Even now we sense how the reduction in the amount of paperwork and idle sessions and the increased rigidity of the accounting demanded for irresponsible leadership, sham, and absence of control are producing their reassuring results. We realize, however, that the work has only begun.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN VOLKOGONOV ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF PARTY PROGRAM

Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian 15 Apr 86 pp 2-3

[Question by A. Zlatomrezhev, Voronezh, and response by Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, under "Questions of Theory" rubric: "The 27th CPSU Congress on War and the Armed Forces"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] One of our principal tasks is to strengthen the Soviet state's defensive capability. What explains the fact that the new wording of the CPSU Program has no special section devoted to these problems?

Source of Wars

This is explained by the fact that military issues are considered in all four sections of the new wording of the party Program. Their entire set makes a new major contribution to the development of Lenin's teaching on war and the armed forces, and on defense of the socialist homeland. Let us touch on some of these problems.

First it should be emphasized that the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th congress and its documents reveal the sources of wars of modern times.

The Congress Resolution on the CPSU Central Committee Political Report states: "Responsibility for wars and conflicts of our era rests with imperialism and imperialism alone." It is common knowledge that a deep-seated source of wars is contained in the exploiting system itself based on private ownership of means of production and on exploitation of workers. Imperialist politics, which reflects and crowns the bourgeoisie's economic class interests, gives rise to domestic and international crises, conflicts and wars. It is easy to be convinced of this by analyzing the sources and causes of any war of "far-off" time or of our time. Assertions therefore are incorrect that today the threat of a possible nuclear war is rooted in the contradiction and opposition of two systems and the two most powerful states, the United States and the USSR.

A similar concept substantiates the thesis of the "equal responsibility" of socialism and capitalism for all wars of modern times, while it is obvious that only one side of the basic contradiction (the imperialist side) is a constant source of wars. WORLD WARS I AND II AND SOME 100 LOCAL CONFLICTS AND WARS OVER THE LAST FOUR DECADES, AND THE EXISTING REAL THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR ARE A DIRECT SOCIAL PRODUCT OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM.

The deep-seated cause of wars of modern times, rooted in the capitalist system, exists constantly, but wars are not absolutely unavoidable. This is especially important to emphasize now, when it is becoming more and more obvious that A NUCLEAR WAR CAN NO LONGER BE A RATIONAL MEANS OF ATTAINING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES FOR AN AGGRESSOR. The qualitative level of contemporary development of military equipment and weapons also puts the fate of war itself on a new plane. The line or limit of war, if it can be thus expressed, sets in at a certain stage (and apparently mankind has reached it). We are speaking here of nuclear war.

A potential aggressor must ponder at some time the question that the choice in war now is not simply between victory and defeat, but between destruction and existence. Not only the possible social consequences of war, but also genetic, ecological, demographic and other consequences give a reminder of the approach of the historic line beginning at which nuclear war becomes totally senseless. Therefore the CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITICAL REPORT TO THE 27TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE NEW WORDING OF THE CPSU PROGRAM SET FORTH A BROAD CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM OF STEPS AIMED AT STOPPING THE ARMS RACE, ENSURING PEACE, AND EXCLUDING WAR FROM SOCIETY'S LIFE.

It stands to reason that Marxist-Leninists do not condemn wars "in general." V. I. Lenin said that there are "wars and wars." Our sympathies always have been and will be on the side of those peoples who wage a just struggle for their social and national liberation and against imperialist dominance and aggression. It is important to condemn not war in general, but the persons to blame for it, the deep-seated sources and causes which engendered it, and the forces which are preparing to plunge mankind into a third world war and are capable of doing so.

Concept of Peace

The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the congress and its documents reflect the conviction of Soviet party members that THE HISTORIC CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS--CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST--CAN AND MUST BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY.

The party Program emphasizes that "the CPSU proceeds from the assumption that no matter how great the threat to peace created by the politics of aggressive circles of imperialism, THERE IS NO FATAL INEVITABILITY OF A WORLD WAR. WAR CAN BE PREVENTED AND MANKIND SAVED FROM CATASTROPHE. THIS IS THE HISTORIC CALLING OF SOCIALISM AND ALL PROGRESSIVE, PEACELOVING FORCES OF OUR PLANET."

BUT UNTIL IMPERIALISM IS READY TO COME TO BROAD CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENTS ON MATTERS OF ARMS CONTROL, THE DOCUMENT STRESSES THAT WE ARE FORCED TO GIVE UNREMITTING ATTENTION TO THE JOB OF STRENGTHENING NATIONAL DEFENSE AND

PROTECTING THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND. The fact is that we cannot fail to take into account that although imperialism cannot win a nuclear war, it is capable of unleashing one.

Under today's conditions the defense of socialism has been transformed into a most important element of the struggle for the survival of civilization and preservation of peace. The dialectics of elements of class and elements common to all mankind is manifested in this issue in such a way that the socialist ideals of peace appear as an expression of the deepest needs of the overwhelming majority of mankind. The fact is that if we ponder the essence of all proposals and programs advanced by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, they reduce to a clear concept: THE IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO AVERT THE DIRECT THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR; THE SUBSEQUENT TASK IS TO MINIMIZE ITS LIKELIHOOD EVEN MORE; AND THE ULTIMATE TASK IS TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR BREAKING OUT.

The fate of preservation of peace and security of nations has never before been so closely tied in with the capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies for their defense. Our party and state believe that THE GREATEST GUARANTEES OF SECURITY IN THE FACE OF THE MILITARIST CHALLENGE OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO LIE IN THE PLANE OF SOCIALISM'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY. THE NEW WORDING OF THE CPSU PROGRAM EVALUATES ITS ESTABLISHMENT AS A HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIALISM. Equality in strategic forces has firmed up the position of the USSR and other countries of socialism and overturned the calculations of aggressive circles of imperialism for victory in a nuclear war. THE DOCUMENT EMPHASIZES THAT "A SERIOUS FACTOR OF ENSURING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LIES IN PRESERVING THIS BALANCE."

The defense of socialism proceeds from a very important political premise: keep the Armed forces at a level precluding imperialism's strategic superiority. Otherwise this would be tantamount to encouraging a potential aggressor.

In essence, the dialectical interrelationship between the balance of strategic forces and assurance of international security acts as one of the leading principles for preserving peace. Therefore the CPSU, emphasizes its Program, "WILL BEND ALL EFFORTS TO SEE THAT THE USSR ARMED FORCES ARE AT A LEVEL PRECLUDING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OF IMPERIALISM'S FORCES..." Reflecting new political realities, this conclusion and line are at the same time an important contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and on defense of the socialist homeland.

Guarantor of Security

The Soviet Armed Forces are responsible for accomplishing the specific missions of assuring the socialist state's security. As emphasized in the new wording of the party Program, they "MUST DISPLAY HIGH VIGILANCE AND ALWAYS BE READY TO STOP IMPERIALISM'S INTRIGUES AGAINST THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES." In essence our Army and Navy are a guarantor of the security of Soviet citizens engaged in creative labor.

Today as never before, the defense of socialism demands not only the presence of appropriate defense potentials (economic, scientific-technical, spiritual, combat), but also the abilities to maintain them in a condition for immediate employment. This is reflected in the fullest form in the combat readiness of Army and Navy forces. Lenin's words that "we must accompany our steps toward peace with the straining of all our military readiness" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 248) have never been so current.

As the party demands, questions of maintaining high combat readiness are the focus of attention of commanders, political bodies and staffs. In accordance with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine WE NEVER WILL BE FIRST TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT CONSIDERING THE TREACHERY OF THE PROBABLE ENEMY, WE MUST BE READY FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ENEMY ATTACK AND FOR HIS UNCONDITIONAL DEFEAT.

The CPSU Program emphasizes that as before, "THE PRINCIPAL BASIS FOR STRENGTHENING THE SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND'S DEFENSES IS THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES."

The party CONNECTS successful accomplishment of long-term strategic tasks WITH A COMPREHENSIVE ELEVATION OF THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN FACTOR. In Lenin's words, the human factor expresses the quality of the "human material" of the Army and Navy. The level of ideological maturity, class vigilance and political responsibility is characterized by the basic element of the military system--man. Assurance of favorable external conditions for building socialism and communism in our country and of security of the entire socialist community depends to a decisive extent on his ability to completely fulfill his military duty. Therefore THE CPSU PROGRAM EMPHASIZES THAT "FORMATION OF A READINESS TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND, TO GIVE IT ONE'S ALL, AND EVEN ONE'S LIFE IF NECESSARY" IS AN IMPORTANT TASK OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION WORK.

Mastery of the depository of ideas set forth in the CPSU Program permits strengthening the ideological indoctrination of workers and enriching their theoretical knowledge on problems of war and peace in the nuclear age, and will promote a solution to specific tasks of strengthening the socialist homeland's defenses.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

GEN ARMY IVANOVSKIY ON COMBAT READINESS IN LIGHT OF CONGRESS

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 5, Mar 86 pp 4-5

[Article by Army Gen Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, CIC of Ground Forces, deputy minister of defense of USSR, HSU, delegate to 27th CPSU Congress: "Our Main Obligation"]

[Text] Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which armed the party and people with a program of our society's accelerated social-economic development, place much emphasis on the country's defense might.

The party proceeds here from V. I. Lenin's instruction. "Whoever forgets the danger constantly threatening us, which will not end so long as world imperialism exists, whoever forgets this will forget our labor republic," wrote Vladimir Ilich, and he emphasized the need for maintaining high combat readiness. This also is dictated by the character of the world military-political situation and by the unabating danger of war being unleashed by the United States and its NATO partners.

The CPSU Program adopted by the Congress in the new wording defines with all clarity the tasks at hand with respect to defensive capability. The Program emphasizes that the Armed Forces must display high vigilance and always be ready to stop the intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies and to defeat any aggressor.

In order to be up to these demands, we must have highest, constant troop combat readiness, i.e., their capability to repel aggression at any moment, no matter where it originates, and deal the enemy a crushing defeat.

This is a complicated, many-sided task, but the task of constant combat readiness is fulfillable thanks to continuous growth in the socialist economic system, achievements of Soviet science, and selfless labor of the Soviet people, who outfitted the Army and Navy with the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment. In combat cooperation with armies of Warsaw Pact member countries, the Soviet Armed Forces are capable of executing any missions to defend socialism's achievements and give international assistance.

Just how is combat readiness defined and what goes to make it up?

Combat readiness is an all-encompassing concept which includes the personnel's high moral-combat qualities, state of training, discipline, and physical conditioning. We also take combat readiness to mean the ability of troops to begin successful combat actions in the shortest possible time periods, outfitting the troops with modern combat equipment and weapons and keeping them in a serviceable condition, and the ability to employ them effectively in combat. The teamwork of control entities, the high level of officer training, the proper manning of units [soyedineniye and chast], a sufficient reserve of specialists, and the necessary quantity of supplies also are basic components of combat readiness.

I wish to emphasize that all these elements of combat readiness are closely interrelated and represent a unified complex where there must not be a single weak link.

Meanwhile it should be noted that the basis of troop combat readiness is their actual combat training and ability to fight in accordance with contemporary demands of combat and win victory over a strong, technically well armed and trained enemy. It is demanded of a soldier of any specialty, whether he be a missileman, tanker, artilleryman or combat engineer, that he skillfully use the combat capabilities which designers placed in modern equipment and armament with maximum return.

Today all combat actions bear an exceptionally complicated and fast-moving character. Therefore the guarantee of high combat readiness is to value the time factor and learn to act quickly, precisely and efficiently. Success in modern combat is achieved by the one who is first to open fire and hit the target with the first round at maximum range. This is no easy matter. A person not only has to handle a weapon excellently, but also have thorough theoretical training in the rules of fire. Therefore constant, intense work to improve weapon proficiency is an urgent demand of the time. The experience of foremost subunits which conduct weapon and tactical training and exercises under the motto of hitting targets with the first round at maximum range is worthy of careful study and dissemination.

Truly high combat readiness can be achieved only by the soldier who has learned his specialty excellently, who has mastered to perfection the weapons and combat equipment entrusted to him, who has taken his actions of controlling mechanisms and instruments to an automatic state, and who ensures their faultless operation.

Rated specialists and persons outstanding in combat and political training in the Ground Forces possess those very qualities. This is achieved by determined labor in the course of day to day training, in tactical problems and practices, and in exercises, especially with field firing. An analysis of the course of combat training shows that the highest results are attained where exercises are conducted under difficult, sometimes critical conditions and where the soldiers' training is carried out according to the principle of "teaching troops what is necessary in war."

Such a situation occurred during a tactical exercise being held with Lt Col N. Senyuk's motorized rifle regiment. Two battalions which were penetrating the

"enemy" defense were halted at first by the defenders' dense, highly effective fire, and then they were counterattacked. The regimental commander was forced to commit Capt A. Baranov's battalion, which at this time was advancing to another area.

The outcome of the action was decided by a matter of instants, but the high degree of combat readiness of Capt Baranov's battalion permitted committing this subunit from the line of march. The battalion commander estimated the situation in a matter of minutes and, directing subordinates skillfully, he struck the flank of the counterattacking "enemy." Success of the fight was decided beforehand.

High combat readiness is inconceivable without firm military discipline, efficiency, order, and strict compliance with demands of the military oath and regulations. As one of the basic elements of combat readiness, discipline permeates all its other components. It is natural that the role of discipline grows along with increased complexity of all combat readiness tasks. It does not have, nor can there be, any "trivial matters"--any deviation from regulation provisions or demands of manuals and instructions. Sluggishness or lack of precision in executing orders of commanders and superiors can involve the disabling of combat equipment or a delay in a missile launch, it can place a combat vehicle under attack, and it can lead to failure to execute a combat mission.

During a battalion tactical night exercise on difficult terrain a tank operated by Pvt A. Shankalov drove off an embankment and a second tank where Pvt M. Talybov was the driver-mechanic got stuck while negotiating an obstacle because of inattentiveness and a late reaction to the senior officer's command. The subunit carried out the assigned mission without two crews.

Or here is another example.

It seemed Pvt Sh. Kuliyev made a minor omission in replacing a BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] fuel pump by not cotterring the mounting elements. The soldier didn't consider the fact that the nuts would come loose during movement because of mechanical vibrations. That is what happened during a march when there was a surprise departure in response to an assembly signal. The fuel began to be forced out and the engine lost power. The forced halt and the search for and fixing of the trouble required considerable time; in the meantime the subunit had gone far ahead. Again an operational training mission was executed at reduced strength.

Of course, people in the overwhelming majority of military collectives clearly realize how important their conscientious military labor is for maintaining high unit and subunit combat readiness. Above all I would like to relate this to those who are on operational readiness duty or who are performing missions as part of a duty team, section or crew. Take that same daily detail. The amount of time which a subunit or unit will have in case they are placed in the highest degree of readiness depends largely on the precision of its actions in performing duty. The selection of well trained privates, NCO's and officers of initiative for performing the duty will, in a difficult situation,

contribute to the fulfillment of all measures required for placing troops in readiness for combat actions.

A very important element of soldiers' combat readiness is their ability to endure great physical and mental stresses, which are inevitable in modern combat. Therefore during training and duty the personnel must be accustomed to actions requiring endurance in a difficult situation, to marches in the heat and cold, day and night, and to strenuous, prolonged work on combat equipment and gear. They must be taught to find a way out of critical situations and to strive for reliability and emotional-volitional stability of soldiers' minds.

Sgt G. Shevela, who is performing duty as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, set an example of firm moral and psychological conditioning when he replaced the disabled commander of a combat engineer platoon during a surprise attack by dushman and was able to organize a rebuff to the bandits and execution of the assigned mission. He was decorated with the "Valor" medal.

In the years of war ordeals this was the quality which helped us hold out and win. "Millions participated in the war, but they did not act as a faceless mass in this battle of unprecedented scope. The high personal qualities of Great Patriotic War soldiers from Pvt Aleksandr Matrosov to Mar Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov were vividly displayed in their heroism," was how CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev put it in his report dedicated to the 40th anniversary of our Great Victory.

I constantly have occasion to be with the troops in exercises and maneuvers, delve into details of the soldiers' combat training, duty and everyday lives, and talk a great deal both with commanders and with the privates. I do this not just in line of duty. As an Armed Forces veteran and frontlinesman who went through the entire Great Patriotic War and lost many comrades in arms in it, I am not at all indifferent as to who replaced them in military formation and whose hands hold the weapons today.

I can say with absolute confidence and pride in the present defenders of the Motherland that they are worthily carrying the baton of combat glory of past soldier generations. Their allegiance to military duty is expressed in that degree of combat readiness which has a quieting effect even on the most shameless lovers of military adventures, and it makes our Armed Forces a powerful factor in deterring imperialism's aggressive aspirations.

But the party teaches us not to rest on our laurels, but to invariably go further and achieve more. We must involve all reserves, all spiritual and physical forces, knowledge and experience in implementing the 27th CPSU Congress resolutions and improving combat readiness. There is no limit to the improvement of combat readiness. That which soldiers have achieved today can no longer fully conform to the demands of tomorrow.

Above all we must raise even higher the level of soldiers' ideological-political indoctrination and the work of forming their Marxist-Leninist outlook, ideological conviction and high moral-combat qualities.

A further improvement in socialist competition is one of the ways in this direction. The ability to make use of its powerful force in the interests of a general upswing in combat readiness was graphically demonstrated by personnel of the Taman Division's guards motorized rifle regiment, which became one of the first guards units in the Great Patriotic War and which won the title of outstanding in precongress competition.

The time periods for making the regiment combat ready have shortened and the personnel's tactical and weapon training has improved. The soldiers hit the majority of targets in exercises and problems with the first round or first burst, and at maximum ranges.

It is noteworthy that two-thirds of all the regiment's party and Komsomol members won the honorable title of outstanding in combat and political training. The Taman soldiers reaffirmed that high combat readiness does not come of itself. It is forged daily by purposeful organizational, ideological, and political indoctrination work of officer cadres and by the selfless military labor of all personnel. It is noteworthy that the new initiators of socialist competition in the Ground Forces, the double-order tank regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col A. Grigorash, established the very same style in their work. Such work experience must be introduced to the activities of all troops.

Winter combat training now is in full swing. It is taking place under the sign of a campaign to realize the historic resolutions of the 27th party congress and is distinguished by the desire of all military collectives to elevate combat training to a higher level. Socialist competition unfolded and gathered force under the motto "We will fulfill 27th CPSU Congress resolutions and will reliably defend socialism's achievements!" Soviet soldiers are inspired to new achievements in military labor by the Motherland's high achievements in building communism and by the impressive prospects of great creation. They see their sacred patriotic and international duty in ensuring reliable protection of the peaceful labor of Soviet people and their allies.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

ON PROBLEMS OF SELECTION OF POLITICAL OFFICER CANDIDATES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 86 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Serebryakov, Chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, under the rubric "Into the Military Schools--the Worthy": "I Am Choosing the Career of a Political Worker"]

[Excerpts] The military political schools are preparing for another recruitment of cadets. It is very important that only the best and most worthy become cadets. After all, the future level of party-political work in the army and navy, success in the accomplishment of even more complex combat and political training tasks than today's, the enhancement of combat readiness of the units and ships and the strengthening of discipline will depend to a significant degree upon the quality of the professional screening and the makeup of the student body at the schools.

Nor can we ignore the fact that the professional training of the group of cadets selected will take place in a situation of an increasing role for political workers as the party's ideological fighters resulting from the implementation of 27th CPSU Congress decisions.

I have before me a composition written in the entrance exams by Cadet Aleksey Korolev. He made his life's choice at a young age, as they say. He knew how much is demanded by the political worker's profession and therefore prepared himself for it purposefully and persistently. Despite this, however, Aleksey was overcome by doubts as to whether he was prepared to become an officer and whether it was his calling to work with people.

In order to avoid making a mistake and to test himself, he did not enter a military school immediately after graduating. Only after serving a year as a soldier did he arrive at the firm conviction that he had set the right goal for himself. "I am consciously choosing a career as a political worker," Aleksey wrote in the composition. "I am deeply convinced that I will not be disappointed in it and will not betray it...."

Cadet Korolev is now a graduate of a military political school.

I feel that this is an instructive example. It is primarily people like Korolev who should become cadets and then officers. Priority should be given to them when making up the student body at military political schools.

It should be said that a great deal is done at the schools to promote the occupation of the officer/political worker among young students, workers and military personnel. With active participation by officers and cadets from the Kiev Higher Naval Political School, for example, Ukrainian television has prepared five programs, including the program "A Special Kind of Weapon," an exciting account of the political workers. Representatives of the school frequently visit school children, students at special vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums, the youth at enterprises and the fightingmen. What I would particularly like to stress is the fact that the career orientation is conducted in a specific manner and is aimed at revealing the best young people, the most active young Communists and Komsomol members, and attracting them to the school.

A great deal of positive work is also performed at other military political schools. Here is what I would like to direct attention to, however. Despite all of the unquestionable importance of military career orientation, the promoting of the career of officer/political worker is only a part, or more precisely the initial stage, of an entire group of tasks involved in making up the student body at the schools. The main thing is to have a well-organized professional screening process, which is designed to single out from the large group of candidates precisely those whose moral-political and work qualities, psychological data, general education and physical conditioning measure up most fully to the demands made of cadets at military political schools today.

Why do we need to focus attention on this? Because, unfortunately, errors are frequently made at this, the first stage. A certain number of young people desiring to enter a military school have been identified at a school, in production or in a military unit, let us say. The proper forms are immediately filled out for them, and with that the officials, institutions, party and Komsomol organizations consider their mission to be over. They sometimes do not even have a proper talk with the candidate selected, do not attempt to determine whether he has the proper qualifications for entering the school.

But the screening should be based on purposeful individual work involving a thorough study of the candidate's personality, his moral and work qualities. And errors are not made where this kind of work is performed.

Last year the political section of the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division imeni M.I. Kalinin selected more than 20 candidates for military political schools. All of them without exception became cadets and are training successfully. It was the same 2 years ago and 3 years ago. The fact that the work is based on an individual approach is precisely what accounts in great part for the success.

Unfortunately, the matter is far from always organized this way. Take the political section of the formation in which Officer E. Yakovlev is the political worker, for example. Individual work is out of the question there, since the political organ's recommendations, which, as we know, should provide an extensive description of the candidate, are printed up in large quantities in advance. A space is left for the names of those wishing to enter a school.

This is a formal approach void of a sense of responsibility. There is no other way to describe it. What is the result of this? I shall cite just one fact. Almost every third serviceman sent for training last year from units of the

Transcaucasus and Baltic Military Districts did not remain at the schools for various reasons. To my knowledge, no one at the local level was even held accountable for deficiencies in the screening of candidates for military political schools.

The larger missions being carried out by the Armed Forces today require a qualitative restructuring of the entire process of preparing military cadres, including officers/political workers. This fact is in turn making it essential to improve the system used for selecting those permitted to attend the schools.

Well-organized professional screening is only possible when a scientific approach is taken. A number of serious studies have been made at the military political schools in recent years, which have resulted in the development of scientific recommendations making it possible to do a good job of selecting cadets and to avoid errors. For example, a group of scientists at the Donetsk Higher Military Political School of Engineer Troops and Signal Troops imeni Army General A.A. Yepishev, together with colleagues from the Donetsk State Medical Institute imeni Maxim Gorkiy, did a special, comprehensive scientific study. The result was the "Methods of Psychophysiological Screening for Higher Military Educational Institutions," which contain many valuable pieces of advice and recommendations. Other sets of methods have also been developed. Their value lies in the fact that they make it possible to fairly fully determine the personal and psychophysiological characteristics of candidates as applicable to the occupation of officer/political worker.

Their effectiveness can be judged from the following example. The psychological methods were used for a study of first-year cadets at the Leningrad Higher Military Political Air Defense School imeni Yu.D. Andropov. It was found that several dozen of them do not entirely meet the requirements set for cadets at military political schools. All of them began to be closely monitored. A great deal of work was performed with them, and they were given extra help. For various reasons, however, a considerable portion of those cadets still did not make it. The data from the study were thus confirmed almost entirely.

These methods have now been sent out to the military districts and fleets, to republic and oblast military commissariats, to wherever professional screening commissions have been set up. One would expect them to find the most extensive application in the work. This is not the case, however. A recent check showed that individual officials in a number of military districts simply laid them aside.

These are rare and atypical cases, of course. Even so, they cannot fail to evoke concern. The future Soviet officer corps depends in great part upon the quality of the screening. It determines who will become the heirs of the commissars tomorrow, who will bear the party concepts to the masses of fightingmen.

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ARMED FORCES

SHCHEGLOV ON IMPORTANCE OF OFFICERS' 'CLOSENESS TO PEOPLE'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 86 p 3

[Article by Army Gen A. Shcheglov, Hero of the Soviet Union, under the rubric "The School of Frontline Experience": "Know Them Not Just by Sight"]

[Text] I love the poetry of Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy. I have loved it since I began reading "Vasiliy Terkin" at the front. Even today, every page of "Kniga pro boytsa" [Book About a Fighter] evokes memories and takes me back to the thoughts and deeds of those heroic years. Not long ago I leafed through it again. I lingered over the chapter "The General." Do you remember how Terkin, after shooting down an enemy aircraft with a rifle, was presented with an award by the division commander himself? And then:

They embraced, two men,
Major general and soldier,
General and beloved son,
Son and very own father.

How subtle and at the same time excitingly simple is the conveyance of the unity of the Soviet people to whom the homeland has entrusted its defense against its enemies and assigned each to his responsible station.... I immediately recalled the commander of our rifle corps, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Nikolay Pavlovich Simonyak, who, it seems to me, embodied the typical features of the officer of frontline times: paternal concern and closeness to people, unity of goals and interests with the soldier and the ability to bear the difficult burden of the war equally with him. And I always see the general from "Terkin" in the image of Nikolay Pavlovich Simonyak.

Yes, today we frequently talk about the need to be close to people, to be able to share a common life with subordinates. And it should be said that there are no problems in relations with subordinates for most of the officers. At the same time, however, we have cases in which certain officers are rude and do not exercise self-control with people; another is conceited and arrogant; and yet another makes no attempt to use a confidential, sincere and friendly language instead of the language of official instructions and orders. Yes, some of them consider warmth and sensitivity to be absolutely unnecessary in the military collectives. Some of them are absolutely unaccustomed to thinking about what they have said to subordinates or how they have said it. Some thus gradually get out of the habit

of vital communication with subordinates, their comrades-in-arms, their fellow fighters, their sworn brothers-in-combat. And if they should go into combat tomorrow, with only seconds for decision-making, would they find the words most needed at those moments, words to which they have become unaccustomed or never uttered in general? And will they not have a bitter sense of suddenly seeing the light? No, I did not treat the men right; I was always near them but not with them.

The commanders at the front knew how to find the right words.

My frontline commander, Nikolay Pavlovich Simonyak, a participant in the civil war, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner during that time. He was in combat from the first days, actually the first hours, of the Great Patriotic War: he commanded a rifle brigade defending the Hanko Peninsula; after that, a division and then a corps on the Leningrad front; and at the end of the war, an army. Whenever and wherever the frontline roads brought us together, I always admired his ability to get people to like him, to be direct, sensitive and fair with them. He always knew how to approach a soldier so that within a few seconds the soldier would have a sense of infinite trust in him. In appearance, Nikolay Pavlovich was a stern man, but as soon as a conversation started, those involved would understand that they were dealing with a responsive, concerned and sensitive individual.

Once, while visiting one of the rifle regiments, the corps commander dropped into the kitchen. It should be said that he never changed in this respect, in his very vital interest in the soldiers' living conditions at the front. Mealtime was over, and the infantrymen were departing, wiping their mess tins. Noticing a tall, broad-shouldered soldier, Simonyak headed in his direction. The surprise of it all made the soldier uncomfortable. The general obviously did not like this. He did not like to instil fear in subordinates.

"What's the matter, son? Haven't you ever seen a general before? Why are you so afraid? Just how are you going to whip the fascists"?

The soldier blushed and shifted awkwardly from one foot to the other, hiding his mess tin behind his back.

"Or is it that you've been poorly fed"?

"No, it was all right," the soldier answered, yielding to the corps commander's confiding tone.

"It doesn't look as though you had a very good meal," Simonyak said, laughing slyly and tugging at the soldier's belt. "Could you find room for more"?

"Yes, I could, Comrade General"!

"Then give me your mess tin. I don't think the cook will refuse a general. Pour this grenadier some.... And give me some too. All right, guardsmen, who is not using his mess tin"?

The soldiers formed a tight circle around the corps commander and showered him with questions about the situation on the fronts and about things in the rear.

Scraping his spoon on the mess tin, Nikolay Pavlovich talked unhurriedly and asked question about their life and their morale. He enquired about how familiar the soldiers were with the missions which lay ahead and how they saw their place in the battle....

His feelings were always sincere and genuine. This reduced the distance between him and his subordinates and put them in a mood to talk frankly. Once, while making the rounds of a rifle regiment's subunits, he reached the position of mortarmen commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Petrov. The corps commander did not take his eyes off the officer's chest while the latter was making his report. No, it was learned a few minutes later, it was not the orders and medals which had drawn his attention, but the red and yellow stripes on Petrov's service blouse.

"I count seven...."

"Yes sir, Comrade General, I was wounded seven times...."

Simonyak was silent. It was apparent that he was overcome by profound feelings. Finally, he said:

"That's a lot of blood you have shed, my friend"! And then he added, as though addressing no one: "How could the fascists ever take Leningrad"?

The dominant feature of Nikolay Pavlovich's character, as I have already stated, was concern for people. He worried about everything having to do with the people: the morale of the soldiers fighting the enemy and their ability to engage in combat, to conduct it so as to defeat the enemy and remain alive themselves. Never ignoring reports from commanders directly subordinate to him, he liked to rely whenever possible on personal meetings and on personal observation of the battlefield. This helped him to adopt the most practical decisions, at times somewhat unexpected decisions.

General Simonyak's concern for good morale among the soldiers existed side by side with persistent attention to the combat training. Exercises were always conducted in the rear area before every operation to breach the enemy's defense. The general attached particular importance to them: this is where the troops learned how to achieve victory with little bloodshed. At his initiative, maps and charts of the terrain were used for working out the optimal versions of operations with all categories of personnel, down to the soldier. Great importance was attached to knowing the enemy and the state of the enemy's defensive installations.

The corps commander demanded that soldiers and commanders engage in physical conditioning and drill even in a combat situation. It was a rule that prior to a battle the soldiers would drill in entering the attack only in double time and taking the enemy's forward position also in double time. Tactical exercises were conducted to a depth of 10-12 kilometers, at a rapid pace. This was called the "start-to-finish attack" in the corps. Whenever possible, terrain was selected for these exercises which was similar to the terrain defended by the enemy on the axis on which the troops would be operating. An attempt would be made to imitate the enemy's engineer preparation of the terrain. General Simonyak demanded that exercises be conducted from daylight to dark, as they say, and he quite often attended them.

Nikolay Pavlovich selected unit commanders like himself. I know and am still friends with one of them, Anatoliy Georgiyevich Afanasyev: a lieutenant colonel and regimental commander at that time, a major general (retired) today. He was a modest and at the same time, demanding and determined commander, a man in the innovative mold. Like Simonyak, he was close and sensitive to people; he always tried to avoid unnecessary casualties, and he spared neither energy nor inventiveness to achieve this.

General Simonyak treated the soldiers like a father, and they repaid him with the same warmth and love. The "soldier's grapevine" passed on from soldier to soldier, from company to company, details of the corps commander's talks with the soldiers and officers, of meetings with him and incidents involving him. That which they liked the most was enlarged with exciting details and became legend-like. I recall hearing a story in one of the corps regiments when the war was already coming to an end about how General Simonyak fought a good hundred fascists by himself and emerged victorious. The tale abounded in such detail, it was as though every person telling the story had been next to the corps commander. And this "tale" lovingly spun by the soldiers was based on a real incident. Once, during the fighting in Estonia, Nikolay Pavlovich arrived at our division's command post. We had spread out maps and were discussing the forthcoming operations. The crackle of submachine-gun rounds suddenly resounded right nearby. Frontliner Simonyak's educated ear immediately identified the sound of German "Schmeissers." It was determined that a large group of Hitlerites was breaking out of encirclement. I issued the necessary orders and turned to the corps commander:

"Comrade General, there is a trench nearby...."

"You do your commanding, Afanasiy Fedorovich, do your commanding," Simonyak answered calmly. "Don't worry about me. Just have them bring my submachine gun from the vehicle...."

This incident was probably the basis of the soldiers' stories about their corps commander.

The general knew many soldiers and commanders by sight, knew their first and last names. I recall traveling with him. He would stop the jeep somewhere at a fork in the forest road:

"Zverev is camped not far from here. Let's drop in on Dmitriy. I really like that fellow...."

Dmitriy Zverev, a captain and a battalion commander, was a courageous and fearless individual. The corps commander had known him when he was still a lieutenant. Or, we might be walking along a trench, when Simonyak would stop by a machine-gun crew:

"Hello, Fedor. Well, is your 'Maxim' still cooking in good order?"

Sergeant Barkhatov would smile. It was pleasant that the general knew his name. And he and his "Maxim" had been fighting since '41, back with the legendary Khanko....

This is how I remember Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Nikolay Pavlovich Simonyak. It is a pity that he lived only slightly more than 10 years after the war: his heart, which had contained so much hatred for the enemy and so much love for the soldier, had worn out at the front. When talk turns to the commander's closeness to subordinates, he is therefore precisely the one I think of, an individual who loved the soldier like a father, who never altered his rule of talking with him unhurriedly and thoroughly and who, in the words of the poet, would:

Look you in the eye
Like a friend,
Shake your hand firmly
And call you by name....

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ARMED FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF BASIC COMPUTER LITERACY FOR ALL OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Master the Use of Computers"]

[Text] Computers are the key element in many weapon systems which the branches of troops and the naval forces have today. Microprocessors qualitatively alter the performance of the different weapons and means of control, and this changes the management functions of commanders and staffs. A knowledge of computers and the ability to use them on the part of the officers is an extremely important factor for enhancing the combat readiness of the units and ships today.

The use of electronic computers, data retrieval systems and other automated information gathering and processing equipment is now an everyday thing, and computers are a tool of labor used by military specialists in the most diverse fields.

Under the conditions of dynamic and fast-moving modern combat, in which it is necessary to draw extensively upon both organic and attached personnel and equipment, there is a certain disparity between the constantly growing volume of information needed by the commander for making decisions and the reduced amount of time available for processing and analyzing it. Today, one can no longer count on imperical experience or mere common sense for assessing the rapidly changing situation. The use of automatic control systems based on electronic computers is the most radical means of dealing with this disparity.

Electronic computers by themselves, without good software, will not have a decisive effect. In addition to the technical aspect of the problem, we must have a clear concept of the peculiarities of interaction between man and machine, the importance of being able to transfer one's knowledge to the computer in the form of precise information, rigid rules, correct algorithms and effective programs. The new equipment, including computers, makes special demands of the ideological maturity, the moral and fighting qualities of the people in charge of it. It has now become particularly apparent that the individual's attitude toward his duty is fully reflected in his attitude toward the equipment.

The further development of automatic means of control of the troops and weapons will continue to involve the improvement of electronic computers and the development of a new generation of computer equipment, which is even now making increased

demands of the training for the personnel. In the various automated control systems, man must measure up with respect to professional, intellectual and psychological qualities to the high level of today's equipment and especially, that of equipment of the future. Otherwise, the capabilities of the most complex and "intelligent" equipment will not be fully realized. This is why the ability to precisely define the task and skills in its formal conceptualization, an unhampered orientation in possible mathematical methods of accomplishing it, an understanding of the operating principles of the electronic computer and a conception of its role in our everyday army and navy life are becoming a part of the officer's general education, an element of his technical sophistication.

There are many units and subunits in the army and navy in which the personnel are successfully mastering computers. Take the nuclear-powered missile submarine on which Captain 3rd Rank S. Prisyazhnyy serves, for example. Most of the crew members are specialists 1st or 2nd class. The combat training is smoothly organized, and a great deal of attention is given to mastering the new equipment and to coordination and interchangeability among the combat crews. The commander strives persistently to see that every officer achieves a high level of professional skill and that skillful use is made of all the automated systems.

Unfortunately, this is not the case everywhere. It is still not a rare thing for officers to avoid using electronic computers in their practical work. To a certain degree this is caused by habit with respect to the traditional style and methods of management, inability to use the equipment, fear of electronic computers and a disinclination to acquire the additional training. Serious shortcomings in the use of the computer equipment is the result, and it frequently breaks down because of incompetent handling.

The complexity of modern computers makes heightened demands also of the officers' theoretical training and requires constant expansion of their scientific and technical perspective. They must not only improve their own knowledge and master everything new appearing in the field of information theory and science and microelectronics, but also pass on that knowledge to their subordinates on a daily basis both in the process of the combat training and through active participation in propaganda lectures and at various kinds of conferences and seminars.

The study of computers at military VUZs demands particular attention. The modern training programs contain fundamental information on the programming of mathematical problems. It is important also for questions pertaining to the use of electronic computers for the mathematical modeling of combat to receive broader coverage in the training process, because universal computer literacy on the part of the officers is an essential precondition for being able to use electronic computers for the accomplishment of those important missions facing the units and ships today.

Improving the training and increasing the skills of scientific and scientific-pedagogical cadres and the work of those instructors who are to pass on their acquired skills and know-how to their colleagues is becoming highly important. This is a key element today, because a poorly trained instructor cannot do a good job of teaching others, particularly such a complex matter as working with computers. The Military Academy imeni F.I. Dzerzhinsky, and particularly the department headed by Major General Yu. Kryuchkov, Professor and Doctor of Technical Sciences, has acquired some good experience in this work.

The party and Komsomol organizations are expected to provide the commanders with a great deal of assistance in mobilizing the personnel to master the computer equipment. They must exert an influence with respect to a psychological readjustment in the people, strive to see that the Communists and Komsomol members set an example in mastering the knowledge and skills involved in working with computers, and establish an atmosphere of intolerance of those who do not wish to keep up with the times.

The in-depth study of military affairs and the full application of all the possibilities of modern science and technology, including microelectronics and information science and theory, is a guarantee of continued enhancement of the combat readiness of the units and ships.

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ARMED FORCES

OBITUARY: LT GEN BELOGORSKIY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 86 p 4

[Text] Lieutenant General (Retired) Anatoliy Ivanovich Belogorskiy, former chief of the Military Educational Institutions Directorate of the Ground Forces, participant in the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, member of the CPSU since 1931, died at the age of 82 following a lengthy illness. He devoted all of his conscious life to serving the socialist homeland and had a long and glorious career in the Armed Forces, rising from Red Army soldier to lieutenant general.

During the Great Patriotic War A.I. Belogorskiy commanded a cavalry division and served as deputy commander of a mechanized corps.

After the war A.I. Belogorskiy was in charge of training officer cadres for the Ground Forces in the central organization of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree, two Orders of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and many medals.

We shall always retain a bright memory of Anatoliy Ivanovich Belogorskiy, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, in our hearts.

Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, I.N. Shkadov, M.D. Popkov, A.M. Mayorov, D.A. Grinkevich, V.A. Merimskiy, P.I. Bazhenov, Yu.A. Naumenko, D.I. Litovtsev, S.I. Varichenko, V.M. Mikhalkin, Yu.T. Chesnokov, S.Kh. Aganov, V.K. Pikalov, Yu.M. Potapov and Yu.M. Andrianov

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BRIEFS

NEW BOOKS FROM VOYENIZDAT--"Voyennaya pedagogika i psichologiya" [Military Pedagogics and Psychology] (A.V. Barabanshchikov, V.P. Davydov, E.P. Utlik and N.F. Fedenko, The Officer's Library, 1986, 240 pages, 1 ruble 20 kopecks): This book reveals the basic principles of Soviet military pedagogics and psychology. The authors offer advice and recommendations whose implementation will help commanders and political workers in their practical work of training and indoctrinating the fightingmen, strengthening discipline and enhancing the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships. "Klassovaya zakalka i razvitiye u voyennosluzhashchikh politicheskoy bditelnosti. Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennoy ideologicheskoy borbe" [Class Tempering and the Development of Political Vigilance in the Servicemen: Problems of War and Peace in the Contemporary Ideological Struggle] (A.Ye. Kuznetsov and N.N. Yefimov, 1986, 62 pages, 5 kopecks): an aid for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers. [Excerpts] [Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 13 May 86 p 2] 11499

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

REMOVING 'TYPICAL ERROR' IN FIGHTER-BOMBER ATTACK

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Grechkin, military pilot-sniper, Red Banner Central Asian Military District, under "For Flight Safety" rubric: "Attitude Toward an Error"]

[Text] Lt A. Pokolov prepared conscientiously for a check-out flight to the range. He responded confidently and precisely to my questions. Pokolov took off and gained altitude without errors. On approaching the range the lieutenant maneuvered vigorously but without violating the given regime, successfully negotiated the "enemy" air defense and promptly detected the small ground target. On receiving the flight controller's permission, he began executing the attack maneuver.

But then Pokolov put the variable-geometry-wing fighter-bomber in a dive. On the aiming path [pritselnaya trayektoriya] I sensed that the lieutenant suddenly began to increase the angle, and because of that the diving speed also rose. I had to urgently intervene in the control. After the landing I asked the lieutenant why he had allowed such an increase in the angle of dive.

"The aiming mark was ahead of the target and I wanted to 'drive' it onto the tank," responded the lieutenant.

It was hard for me to restrain my surprise, but it was not the very fact of the novice's error (who is insured against errors in the development period?) that surprised me most. The fact is that I already had heard exactly the same answer in the previous flight section from Lt L. Leonidov, a classmate of Pokolov's from school and a pilot of the adjacent flight of this same squadron; he made exactly the same mistake in an attack against a ground target.

It turns out that Pokolov had heard nothing about his comrade's error. I learned from a conversation with Squadron Commander Maj A. Chapovoy that the deficiencies in Lt Leonidov's actions had been examined in detail only in the flight where Leonidov flew.

"The important thing, in my view, is that the pilot himself and his flight leader went into the situation. They are the ones to remedy these deficiencies," said the squadron commander, expressing his viewpoint.

Such was the attitude (and, frankly speaking, an incorrect attitude) toward a subordinate's error. The error in flying techniques made by lieutenants Pokolov and Leonidov can be categorized as typical for novices who are mastering the given fighter-bomber (in school they had flown another combat aircraft and already had developed certain habits in executing elements of flight assignments).

It would seem that on identifying the reason for Leonidov's error and knowing that some lieutenants, including Pokolov, had flown another type of aircraft for combat application at school, the squadron commander would immediately take necessary steps to avoid these "typical" errors henceforth. He would explain in advance to the novices how to act in various flying situations and tell in detail about the aircraft's reaction to evolutions of the controls, i.e., he would morally prepare the young pilots for what was for them an unaccustomed behavior of the aircraft and would teach them proper actions. Then he would help them practice similar situations on the simulator. Unfortunately, Maj Chapovoy didn't do this, which contributed to the appearance of Lt Pokolov's error.

Practical experience teaches that commanders must publicize all deficiencies identified during flights. It must be borne in mind here that mistakes are made not only by novices, but also by first-class military pilots. Such blunders also cannot be hushed up, since there is no guarantee that this mistake will not be repeated by a colleague, and if an experienced aviator was able to correct it promptly, a novice might lose his head in such a situation. In the best instance this would involve one or more check-out flights, additional fuel and ammunition expenditure, and depletion of aviation equipment operating life. And the pilot will begin to lag in fulfilling the combat training program, which will have a negative effect on combat readiness of the subunit and of the unit as a whole. The psychological effect of the error and its consequences on the pilot also cannot be discounted.

Not only Maj Chapovoy, but also some other commanders underestimated the role of publicity in preventing flying incidents. In their opinion, a frank discussion should be held at the squadron or unit level only about positive experience. They believe it is enough to discuss deficiencies with the specific culprit and his superior. This usually is motivated by the idea that such a conversation involving other people allegedly traumatizes the young aviator's mind or wounds the self-esteem of an experienced military pilot. As a result the critique of deficiencies takes place without a detailed analysis of reasons for the errors and without identification of weak points, and measures to prevent their repetition are not worked out. In short, reserves for improving the training process are not properly used.

In some places only those mistakes which the flight controller or senior commander present at the airfield noticed are openly analyzed. That also was the case until recently in the aforementioned squadron in particular. Only five pilot errors were entered in the appropriate log here in a month of

combat training. All of them were registered in the flight controller's zone of visibility, on the landing. These five errors were gone into more or less in detail in the presence of all squadron flight personnel.

But it would be incorrect to shift all the blame for this to young squadron commander Maj A. Chapovoy. Serious claims should be lodged against officers of the regimental command element who saw the miscalculations in the squadron commander's methodological training but didn't take prompt steps to remedy them and didn't help him get rid of them. As a result one and the same mistakes in the air roamed from section to section until the intervention of officers from the district aviation staff.

And here one cannot help but mention one other reason which sometimes prompts subunit commanders not to widely publicize mistakes made by subordinates in flights. The fact is that all "rough areas" registered are taken into account when results of socialist competition at the regimental level are summed up. No one wants to be among the laggards.

In other words, commanders fear censure addressed to them, and so they try to remedy deficiencies on the q.t., as the saying goes, without publicity, so that as few of the pilots as possible know about the errors. And so it turns out that even people in flights of the same squadron don't know about neighbors' errors and repeat them.

Exactly the same picture can sometimes be observed at the regimental level, and this is why. I once had occasion to witness an incident where a young pilot forgot to set the requisite wing sweep when making a range approach to fire rocket projectiles against a ground target. The range flight controller noticed the error and forebade work.

The regimental commander went into this deficiency in the work of yesterday's school graduate with all regimental flight personnel, and additional simulator training was held with the novices. The commander also considered it his duty to report what happened to higher headquarters. In so doing he was guided by the fact that other units also had young pilots who had begun mastering the given type of aircraft and consequently were not insured against similar mistakes.

The party member and leader also reported what work had been done to remedy and prevent these gaps in the training of young military pilots. And what happened? The regiment, which for a long while had been in good repute, was immediately transferred to the average category. The commander and his deputies were accused of poor work with flight school graduates, although other novices were successfully mastering the flight training program here. Later they were "mentioned" for a long while yet at various conferences in recalling that incident.

After this will the commander henceforth also broadly publicize subordinates' errors? I honestly admit that this is hardly possible. Seeing this happen, the other commanders fell to thinking: isn't it sometimes better to be silent about errors than to receive undeserved reproaches for an honest report? The

fact is that the common cause of assuring flight safety and a growth in aviators' combat proficiency was clearly the loser because of this.

The time has come, in my view, to judge the state of affairs in regiments and squadrons not by the number of errors identified by commanders and instructor pilots, but by how work is carried out to prevent preconditions for flying incidents and to eliminate deficiencies keeping flight personnel from improving flight and tactical training. Honest reports about aviator errors, sometimes identified with difficulty, and objective information cannot be allowed to turn into something unpleasant for those who call a spade a spade who evaluate subordinates' training self-critically and with principle. To the contrary, a very strict accounting must be demanded of those commanders who, in pursuit of imaginary well-being, engage in glossing over the actual state of affairs and who prefer private critiques of military pilot errors. Only this approach will permit activating the human factor and will accelerate the process of renewing forms and methods of work to further improve flight safety and unit and subunit combat readiness.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MAJ GEN KRASNORUTSKIY DISCUSSES PILOT TRAINING FOR AIR COMBAT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 86 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Avn E. Krasnorutskiy under the rubric "Commander Training": "A High Rating, But Skill?"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel I. Belyakov, military pilot-marksman, was assigned a particularly complex combat mission in the tactical air exercise.

People in the regiment were well aware of the energy and effort the officer had put into achieving this highest level of flight and combat skill. Not a single inspection, even the toughest, could disclose any fault with the pilot's air training or his technical competence. And Belyakov had no equal in the regiment with respect to fire and tactical training. When he was awarded the title of military pilot-marksman, his colleagues in the regiment expressed their attitude succinctly: He deserved it.

A pilot-marksman stands out among the airmen. The youth emulate him and listen to his every word on the ground and in the air.

"Learn from it! That is not a takeoff but a picture!" one of the flight commanders told his subordinates with admiration when Lieutenant Colonel Belyakov elegantly lifted his missile carrier into the air, climbed steeply and took the aircraft beyond the clouds. "That one will not let you down"!

Clouds and the enormous distances concealed the scene of the battle from his comrades-in-arms. No one doubted that the pilot-marksman would be victorious, however. The regiment had never yet seen Belyakov return from a flight with the objective control film recording a failure.

This time, however, the news suddenly spread over the airfield that Lieutenant Colonel Belyakov had not completed the mission. "That can't be!" was the first reaction. But one of the regimental veterans said with chagrin: "Belyakov has grown overconfident"!

No one paid any attention to the statement at the time. Its meaning became clear later, when the first failure was followed by another and the enthusiastic praise was replaced by a scrupulous and principled critique and analysis of the pilot's performance in the air.

Before a serious critique of the occurrence was begun, I heard the fairly widespread opinion that actually nothing terrible had occurred, that the veteran pilot had made a mistake, that it was an accident. Permit me to disagree.

It is a fact that no one is protected against errors in the flight work. The pilot's activity is so diverse and so replete with various introduced situations that no briefing and no manual can tell one completely ahead of time what to do in this or that sudden situation in the air.

Modern aerial combat involves much maneuvering, is filled with highly complex techniques and is fast-moving. The slightest clumsiness in piloting techniques or the slight imprecision in the employment of the weapons has serious consequences. In order to be victorious over the enemy in modern combat, it is essential to achieve a high level of perfection in one's flying skill, learn how to defeat the enemy with the first attack, the first round or the first missile. A military pilot-marksman must be distinguished by this ability in any situation.

A pilot feels confident in the sky, however, when he works constantly and persistently to improve his skills in piloting and conducting aerial combat. The cause of Lieutenant Colonel Belykov's failure was that he had done the opposite and had lost his good professional abilities.

Years of hard work are essential in order for an airman to rise to the highest level of skill. It involves various levels of air training: 3rd, 2nd and 1st class and then the rating of military pilot-marksman. Probably every pilot dreams of earning this title. This is a commendable desire. It is a direct duty of commanders and political workers to support it in the air fighters. It is not enough simply to desire to reach the highest level of professional skill in anything, however. One has to strive unceasingly for it. I would describe this striving with one of the basic principles underlying the training in military affairs: the improvement of knowledge and skills, moving from the simple to the more complex.

All of these degrees of professional growth are mandatory for every pilot. He cannot skip one of them and go immediately to the next highest. Belyakov also passed through them. Each time, before receiving the next rating, there was a test in the theory and praxis of piloting and combat employment. I would even say that the most stringent requirements are set for the air fighter for receiving the highest classification.

I shall not go into detail about the exercises in which a pilot-marksman is tested. I would say in general with respect to their complexity that the training level of the candidate for marksman is tested at night in the worst possible weather. This means aerial battles in clouds, out of sight of land or the natural horizon, takeoff and landing with reference points visible only after passing the long-range precision approach radar. The bombing, the cannon firing and missile launching always involve actual target destruction. The pilot-marksman's performance is assessed equally rigorously in the daytime. These criteria are also specified in the pertinent documents. They include the ability to conduct single and group, maneuvering aerial combat at all altitudes and to destroy small ground targets with the first attack, using complex forms of maneuver.

For many years I have been a member of commissions for determining the professional skill of flight personnel, and I have become convinced that a pilot 1st class trained in the regiment to the level of marksman is capable of passing the most rigorous test. A certain amount of time passes, and the qualitative indicators of the pilot-marksman's air training change. For most of them these indicators shine with the increasing brilliance of perfection, like the facets of a diamond, but in individual cases they begin to lose their luster. One automatically asks why officers meet the requirements without strain during the period of preparing for and taking the tests for the highest flight classification and then somewhat later, perform considerably below the standard requirements.

The loss of skill first goes unnoticed, beginning with complacency. Individual pilots-marksman, assuming that they have reached the limit, cease to improve their training. And the commanders, unfortunately, do not demonstrate proper demandingness of them. The fact of the matter is that marksmen are mainly officers in supervisory positions. And although the documents governing flight work state that no pilot, regardless of his position, his rank or classification, has the right to take to the air without proper preparation for the flight and without a check of his preparedness, this law is sometimes violated in reality.

Relying upon the marksman's wealth of experience, individual regimental commanders do not monitor his preparation, "do not notice" that the marksman is practicing the same exercises in the air as the pilot 2nd class. Instead of a detailed and instructive critique of errors committed by him in the execution of a mission, some commanders at best merely reprove the marksman privately or say to him in passing something which binds him to nothing: "I believe you will figure it out on your own"! And when this becomes a regular thing, the marksman senses that he is not being monitored by the commander, becomes convinced of his own infallibility and naturally, ceases to prepare seriously for flights or to view his every error self-critically.

That category of air fighters, the pilot-marksman, for some reason frequently stop receiving the attention of the regimental methods councils. Take a look at their working papers: the focus is on problems of training the youth and instructors. As a rule, the party organization reacts to deficiencies in the personal preparation of pilot-marksman with a mild discussion. In my opinion, the existing standards for reaffirming (I underscore this: for reaffirming, and not for receiving) the highest flight rating do not measure up to the level of development of aviation technology or to the demands of modern combat.

Some regimental commanders know that pilot-marksman under their command are reaffirming their rating on the basis of standards specified for pilots 1st class. It is time to think about this situation, which, unfortunately, has become fairly widespread in recent years. In some places pilot-marksman fly an intensive schedule during the first 2 or 3 months of the training year, build up flying time and landings at night in very bad weather and then relax, considering that they have met the norm for reaffirming their classification. After that they fly just to maintain their training level, as the saying goes. They bask in the rays of past glory and do not notice that they are not just marking time but are losing their flying skills.

Lieutenant Colonel Belyakov's complacency and his reliance on his extensive past experience are what caused his failure to carry out the combat training mission. Lieutenant Colonel V. Litvinov, pilot-marksman, flew practically none for combat employment last year and did not fulfill the plans for the basic kinds of flight training. Lieutenant Colonel V. Korneshev, military pilot-marksman, has been disciplined and brought to party accountability for serious deficiencies in his flight training....

Yes, there are many pilot-marksman in the Air Forces in whom more than just their comrades-in-arms rightly take pride. But this makes it all the more intolerable to see individual officers who are considered to be masters of combat employment but have in fact already lost that skill.

11499

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

REGIMENT FINDS WEAKNESS IN MANUAL CONTROLLED PINPOINT BOMBING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 86 p 1

[Article by Maj G. Torzhok, Red Banner Belorussian Military District, under the rubric "The Combat Training: Effectiveness, Quality": "An Unexpected Introduced Situation"]

[Text] The fighter-bomber piloted by Military Pilot 1st Class, Captain V. Monakhov, flight commander, was rapidly disappearing beyond the horizon. The air fighter was carrying out an important mission to destroy a small ground target. This is not an easy thing to do at night.

It was not easy even in the daytime, incidentally. The pilot had performed successfully during the day, however. He did so with the help of a flight navigation system, to be sure. Even now Monakhov was confident that he would not miss. He knew the target coordinates, and the equipment would not let him down.

Captain Monakhov skillfully overcame the "enemy's" PVO zone and set out for the range. There was not a cloud in the sky. The stars shone brilliantly.

After maneuvering once more the fighter-bomber began approaching the precalculated position. At that time an order came from the ground:

"135, manual release...."

This change surprised Monakhov somewhat. He took the aircraft toward the ground. At the precalculated point he pressed the "Release" button. He reported to the commander:

"This is 135. Mission accomplished."

The veteran pilot did not doubt that he had destroyed the "enemy."

On the ground, however, it was determined that the bomb had missed the target by a large distance. A different crew had to complete the assigned mission.

It was determined by means of objective control facilities that at the crucial moment the flight commander had erred, had not maintained the prescribed flight conditions. The diving angle was considerably less than the precalculated one, for example....

Monakhov's error was no accident. Unfortunately, the air regiment does not devote enough attention to manual bombing practice, and such flights are very rarely scheduled for the airmen.

It is the opinion there that the most important thing is to bomb skillfully, using the flight navigation system, in the automatic mode. This, they reason, permits the pilot to destroy targets under the poorest of conditions, with complex types of maneuver. The experience of frontline fighters, however, and that of airmen who have served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan has shown that the air fighter who can use the entire range of means of combating the enemy is the one who is victorious.

Unfortunately, this is forgotten in the regiment. Errors like the one made by Captain Monakhov are therefore committed by other pilots as well, particularly the young ones. Lieutenant V. Yesin, for example, was unable to execute a bombing well.

The trainer's possibilities with respect to teaching the pilots how to operate manually at the range are still not being fully utilized by far. Exercises on the trainer are not conducted regularly, and they are set up according to a standard, simplified plan. This accounts for the low level of effectiveness.

The know-how of the masters of combat employment, those who are capable of destroying small targets both by means of the flight navigation system and manually, needs to be publicized more actively in the regiment. Pin-point strikes by Major G. Voronin and Captain A. Chausov, military pilots 1st class, and others regularly get good ratings, but their know-how has still not been made available to all.

In order to improve the combat training during the summer period, officers in charge in the regiment and the party organization should strive more persistently to find ways to intensify the combat training, demonstrate greater creativity in its organization and resolutely combat various kinds of conventionalities and simplification. Only with this approach will every flight and every exercise in combat employment represent another step toward professional skill on the part of the airmen.

11499
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NAVAL FORCES

DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGES OF YOUNG WARRANT OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Pochtarev, senior instructor in the Komsomol Work Department of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Burn from a 'Hot Hand'"]

[Text] At the fleet personnel directorate, Capt 1st Rank Ye. Shilov and I are looking over the personal files of young warrant officers submitted for discharge from the Armed Forces. Some have served several years, and other less.

"Note that nearly all are Komsomol members," Yevgeniy Vasilyevich says.

The reproach was sufficiently transparent and quite justified. Yes, the commander makes the decision on warrant officer school candidates and also on the fate of warrant officers. But the Komsomol organizations and their leaders are also involved. Unfortunately, some Komsomol bureos and committees reduce their participation in the development of young warrant officers to merely preparing documents for their discharge into the reserve. Unfortunate, but true.

Here is the personal file of a Warrant Officer A. Rubanov, leader of a team of radio telegraph operators, who served on the escort ship Ryanyy for a little over 3 years. From the materials submitted it was apparent that at first things went pretty well for him. Then the warrant officer suddenly lost interest in his duties. Why did this happen? The Komsomol activists should have pondered this question, shown some interest in the young man, and offered some comradely criticism. But this was not the case. There was indifference and a statement of faults. They then decided to get rid of him: that was simpler. Becoming familiar with the state of affairs in the unit where Sr Lt A. Chuntalaov is the Komsomol worker convinces one that the Komsomol leaders here do not bother themselves with educating specialists coming in from warrant officer schools. Instead of confidential talks, there are edifications and dressing down. Beyond the paperwork they do not see a living person with his sometimes unsteady character and strong and weak points. Here is another example. In a year of duty on an escort ship, Warrant Officer V. Chibiray did not have any punishments. But he has already been submitted for discharge. One is at least amazed at the stand of the ship's Komsomol

committee secretary, who did not even find time to give a performance report on the person. One cannot tell whether the young Komsomol warrant officer performed so poorly or whether they worked with him on the ship with unfit methods. These questions, as they say, remain open.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few cases like this. Behind each of them is the fate of a person, an unworthy fleet specialist.

"We have fallen under the 'hot hand,'" is how Komsomol worker Sr Lt V. Fedorchenko answered when asked why Komsomol organizations 'vote' so freely for discharging into the reserve warrant officers who have barely started serving.

I will not hide the fact that I was bothered by this statement which at first seemed witty. It is bad when certain officials, without getting into the heart of the matter, are ready to resort to the extreme--discharging a warrant officer from the Armed Forces. But it is even worse when the initiator of such "decisive actions" is sometimes the Komsomol committee. Warrant Officer V. Vorozheykin served for a long time on the Guards guided missile patrol boat Amurskiy Komsomolets. One day the officer-in-charge, inspecting the condition of shore galley, discovered quite a few discrepancies. Warrant Officer Vorozheykin was on duty.

"Discharge him," was the conclusion.

Indeed, he was discharged. But the warrant officer was burned, perhaps, not so much by rashness of the deciding of his fate, but by the position of the Komsomol committee. The commander of the unit in which Vorozheykin was serving until his discharge, Capt 3d Rank A. Ivanov, speaks well of the warrant officer. But the Komsomol performance report witnessed by political worker Capt 3d Rank V. Vinogradov contradicts this. Who is right?

I had the opportunity to investigate this case. The sad end of Vorozheykin's fleet service was not only the result of his mistakes and omissions, but also evidence of complacency and lack of consideration for the person by the Komsomol organization headed by Lt V. Zagoruyko. What is doubly annoying is the thought that this took place on a Guards ship named after the Komsomol, which, you will agree, makes it incumbent upon the Komsomol committee to work with young people in order to demonstrate a worthy example for others. But this is not the case. They got carried away with speechifying and various mass measures. In so doing they wasted their efforts and energy primarily on struggling for points and percentages, which given even a small tendency to grow gave rise to complacency. If someone spoiled or might spoil the overall background, steps were taken: They assigned them to other units or, as we have been convinced, stepped up the process of discharging them to the reserve. The result of this was that after a short, let us call things by their names, show of prosperity, the Amurskiy Komsomolets lost ground in combat training and in competition, and was deprived of the title of outstanding.

To fight for the spirit of the Komsomol organization and for its prestige means to fight for every person and for his fleet vocation. Members of the

Komsomol committee of the leading aircraft carrier cruiser in our fleet, the Novorossiysk, understand this well. Headed by its secretary Lt V. Nalimov, the committee carefully, to put it most accurately, develops in the young specialists a sense of responsibility. This has reflected in the organization of dynamic socialist competition and its results. Once you become a class specialist, help a junior or one who is lagging behind. Once you exceed combat standards and save material, pass on the experience to others. These are but a few of the morale aspects of competition on the Novorossiysk.

The Komsomol organization of a nuclear missile submarine also has some achievements. This is evidenced by the high level of training mission performance during an extended underwater deployment. As the commander of the submarine noted, the members of the Komsomol committee have made weighty utterances. Capt-Lt A. Ladygin and other comrades surround the young people with attention. And the result: not a single "failure." Constant enthusiasm for duty and a desire to execute their military duties conscientiously characterize the absolute majority of the specialists. Komsomol collectives that are accelerating their advancement to be among the leaders by getting rid of people with a "difficult nature" would do well to arm themselves with this instructive experience.

Such a method, it seems, is nothing more than a way of doing something for show. I recall a conversation with one Komsomol leader of a ship during preparation for an ocean cruise. He responded about the best specialists as if reading from a sheet:

"All of our specialists are front-rank. We 'gave' those who were remiss to our neighbors or discharged them."

'Give,' discharge... I cannot help but think: After all, such methods are no secret to your neighbors. I also assume that soon the Komsomol committee of some or other ship will be astonished: Where do these young and already "unpromising" warrant officers come from? Why is it so difficult to fill our billets? "Resourcefulness" in due course can turn into new case packages with materials for discharge to the reserve.

Our dynamic times require a reorganization on the march and substantial adjustments in educating young warrant officers. One cannot help but see or pay attention to the fact that the traditional "worn out" measures are already on edge, wasting efforts for naught. A solution here can be seen in a creative search and in decisively rejecting banality and stereotype. Let us touch upon another facet of this question. Warrant officer school graduates, as we know, are assigned to a position according to the specialty received. Some of them after their studies, having felt the "ground under their feet," find cause for various sorts entertainment measures, thereby compromising both rank and position. Of course, this requires a great deal of preventive and educational work with youth. One can name quite a few addresses where the Komsomol committee, as they say, watch with both eyes so that the prestige of the warrant officer rank does not suffer. Here both concern and strictness of punishment are of appreciable benefit. Nevertheless, in a number of places they take the path of least resistance, without using the material of a great mobilizing force which they have right at hand. What do I have in mind? On

each ship, in a unit or formation, the vast majority of warrant officers are people who love the service and their ship. There are many in the Navy who began with seaman's shoulder boards and continue to serve for decades on their native ship. But do the young people know much about such warrant officers? Practically nothing.

Or let us take the selection procedure for warrant officer schools. Komsomol bureaus and committees also participate in it. We all know that cases where some pert Komsomol leader promises newcomers mountains of pleasures and carefree duty. If only to carry out an order from a higher echelon. But they do not always pay attention to quality. As a result, the warrant officer ranks end up with casual people looking for the abovementioned "beautiful and easy life." For this reason we end up with a discord between a dream and harsh reality. Here much depends on the mature approach of the Komsomol committee and its educational efforts aimed at successful development of specialists in warrant officer shoulder boards. The Komsomol must see before them not some abstract members, but real people--like Rubanov, Chibiray, or Vorozheykin mentioned above. And they must not simply be seen, but consistently be put on the right path.

12567

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MILITARY-EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

ON USE OF COMPUTERS IN OFFICER EDUCATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 86 p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Zlydnev and Maj V. Shchepilov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "He Recommends Electronic Computers: On the Use of Electronic Computers in the Training of Future Officers"]

[Text] What requirements does the seagoing specialist need to meet in order to carry out his functional duties with certainty and reliability? This is purely a rhetorical question: the requirements are well known. They include as an absolute condition, a fundamental knowledge of military affairs and shipboard service, and solid practical skills. There are fairly frequent cases, however, in which graduates of military schools with what would appear to be substantial theoretical and practical training have become confused and made mistakes in situations which were not so very complex. They lacked not only experience and practical skills, but also moral qualities, will and psychological tempering.

With time, of course, the young officers acquire experience, develop the qualities needed by the seagoing specialist and learn not to lose their presence of mind in unusual situations. Is it necessary to lose time, however, necessary to wait for extreme conditions in order to reveal the individual's true capabilities? Could this not be done within the walls of the military school? Could the specialists not be trained in such a way that they are prepared to perform confidently under practically any circumstances? This can be done, it turns out. It requires revealing at the initial stage of the training the specific features of the cadet's character, his psychophysiological characteristics. Only then is it possible to predict in good time his behavior in a specific situation and to purposefully shape stable moral qualities, will and psychological qualities in him.

And so, the solution to the problem can be reduced to a fairly simplified formula: reveal and shape. With respect to the development and shaping of the necessary qualities in the future specialist, everything is clear: there are scientific recommendations and there is extensive know-how accumulated by more than a single generation of commanders, political workers and military instructors.

But how is one to thoroughly study the specific features of his personality, his character, with a minimum of time available, without observing the rule of spending a long time together? After all, each person is an individual in his own way and has his own unique psychophysiological characteristics. Is it possible to measure them somehow, and is the very idea of "measuring" character not absurd?

Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Kascheyev, Candidate of Psychology and an officer at the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov, and his colleagues have come up with affirmative answers to these questions. Yes, they maintain, individual character can be quantitatively assessed if it is represented as a function with many unknowns. In other words, it can be measured.

The psychological diagnostic system worked out by the innovators makes it possible to measure the psychophysiological characteristics and other mental qualities of the individual.

The functioning of the system is based on the use of scientific achievements in microelectronics, psychology and pedagogics, as well as achievements in the field of theoretical fundamentals of psychological diagnostics and the principles for their practical application.

Yuriy Sergeyevich Kascheyev heard about the concept of using technical means for determining an individual's psychophysiological characteristics for purposes of revealing his professional suitability for a specific military specialty for the first time when he was still a warrant officer. He was taken with the idea and wasted little time in embodying it in a unique instrument. That first instrument was the prototype of the present psychological diagnostic system created under the supervision of Officer Kascheyev, Honored Rationalizer of the RSFSR.

When they developed the system, Kascheyev and his associates set themselves the fairly narrow but very important task of using electronic computers to improve the professional screening of cadets. In the course of the work, when the systems were being adjusted and the psychological diagnostic processes had been automated, other possibilities of the system became apparent, possibilities which could be used in the training and indoctrination of cadets. Subsequent experience confirmed this. The system makes it possible to reveal psychophysiological data, to reveal them on a comprehensive basis, for more than 100 people. In addition, the commanders and military instructors obtain a vast amount of additional information on the degree of development of the individual's abilities and his specific features, and information on the communicative qualities of people. And not just at the stage of professional screening, but also after the cadets are learning the specialty. Is there any need to say how important such information is for both the officers/educators and the cadets themselves?

The following aspect of the matter must also be noted. The so-called questionnaire research method is presently used for revealing the psychophysiological data for cadet candidates during the period of professional screening at the schools. It essentially consists of the following. During a specific period of time the individual must answer questions on special tests. The answers are then analyzed by military psychologists and other specialists and provide the basis for determining the individual's suitability for a specific military specialty.

For all its apparent worth, the method has a large number of shortcomings. During the professional screening period, for example, one psychologist has to analyze numerous data for an average of 1,000 individuals. The poor quality of the studies and the errors stem from this.

A second factor: the data obtained on a cadet during the professional screening can subsequently be used only as a starting point. Some of his qualities are clearly defined, while others are suppressed. But how are these qualities altered by specific indoctrinational measures? Or are they not altered at all, so that other, effective ways need to be found?

In addition to other merits, the psychological diagnostic system has the virtue that it provides maximum objectivity. Practically all of the functions are performed by an electronic computer. The very minimum amount of time is needed to study even a hundred people. Outwardly, this is the way it looks. The testees sit in front of a screen. Each is equipped with a headset through which are transmitted commands, assignments, commentary on them or explanations of the images appearing on the screen. On the tables are panels with feedback transmitters, by means of which the testees interact with the electronic computer processing and analyzing the incoming information. After an assignment is completed, the machine issues all of the essential data for each individual: attention span, memory for numbers, thought association, the ability to analyze, summarize and compare, logic of thought process, and so forth.

The electronic computer stores in its memory bank all of the data on each cadet. When the studies are repeated (the studies are performed as this becomes necessary), it compares the new data with the old and immediately issues the results. It is the job of the commanders and instructors to analyze them, derive conclusions and make adjustments in the cadet's training and indoctrination. We would stress the fact that the adoption of electronic computers in no way reduces the role of the individual approach or the individual influence of the instructor, the commander or the political worker upon the cadet.

A psychological-pedagogical service has been set up at the school, based on the automated psychological diagnostic system developed by Kascheyev. It is perhaps too early to speak of the final results, because the service is still at the stage of search and development. Certain data can be cited, however: cadet dropouts have been cut in half. The cadets have become markedly more active in the training. This alone, we believe, should generate confidence that the direction selected by the innovators is a promising one.

The specialists themselves are of this opinion.

"I am confident that both the psychological diagnostic systems and the psychological-pedagogical service have a great future," believes Vice Admiral Anatoliy Mikhaylivich Kosov, Chief of Naval Educational Institutions. "Such services should be set up at other schools as well. Kascheyev has already been issued an assignment to prepare the technical documents for the psychological-pedagogical system in order to do this."

"The system is promising from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. I am convinced that it will become widely used," says Doctor of Psychology, Professor Yuriy Mikhaylovich Zabrodin, Kascheyev's scientific supervisor and deputy director of the Psychology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. "I am thinking not just of the direct purpose of the system. Let us think about this: How can the human factor be activated? Obviously, we need to create conditions under

which the individual can utilize his talents and possibilities in the best possible way. On the other hand, these talents and possibilities need to be constantly developed and stimulated. There is an extremely close interdependence in this area."

We can see that the opinions of competent specialists are the same. And it is perfectly apparent that the innovation should find extensive application also at other VUZs in the very near future. This is necessary in the interest of restructuring the military school and the training of the officer corps. There is a substantial problem in the way of its adoption, however: the system requires considerable economic outlays. Modern electronic computers and specialists are needed. The resolution of this problem depends in great part upon agencies providing material support for the VUZs. Their position will determine to a considerable degree whether the innovation is successfully put to use.

11499

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MILITARY HISTORY

VE DAY ARTICLES

Col Gen Lobov Article

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 86 p 3

[Article by Col Gen Lobov, commander of Red-Banner Central Asian Military District and delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress: "Measuring Ourselves Against the Feats of Our Fathers"]

[Text] The times are demanding. The time that has passed since the 27th CPSU Congress is severely testing communists. It is testing their ability to act under new conditions energetically, creatively, and decisively. Faced with the times, the party is increasing the accountability of each of us for our attitude toward our cause.

Today, when the arms race on the part of the United States and the development of military equipment have reached a critical point, there is no cause more important than the struggle for peace and preventing a new world war. "The CPSU will make every effort," it is recorded in the new wording of the Party Program, "to see that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level which would preclude strategic superiority of the forces of imperialism, comprehensively improve the defensive capabilities of the Soviet state, and strengthen the combat cooperation of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries." The criticality of the times in which we are living, the sense of patriotism and civic duty, and responsibility for the present and future of the fatherland make it incumbent upon every Soviet person to do everything in his power to strengthen the defensive capabilities of our country.

Accelerating scientific and technical progress and reorganizing social production, psychology, style and methods of work are dictated by external reasons also--above all the critical international situation caused by the intensive military preparations of the aggressive imperialist circles led by the United States.

The aim at speeding up scientific and technical progress stems from the objective requirements of developing the economy. The difficulty in accelerating this important and timely aim of our party is that it must not only be rationally understood, but also accepted psychologically, and this is not possible without overcoming set stereotypes in thinking. Today, when the

country is conducting a harsh "revision" of age-old habits, many important problems require that they be looked at with a fresh view.

One of the primary problems is military-patriotic with youth. Preparing young people for service in the Army means to prepare future defenders of the homeland. This is a nationwide matter. Each person must do his bit here. This involves, above all, the human factor, the person himself, whose education begins in the family, in school, and at factories. Education may be effective only with maximum specificity and individual work with the person. No one should be on the sidelines when it involves the security and defensive capabilities of our country. This concerns everyone without exception. The Army educates up young people as patriots of their country and imparts to the defenders of the homeland professional military skills, but the responsibility for preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces lies with the family, school, party, Komsomol, and social organizations, and all supervisory personnel of the country.

From today's positions, we cannot be satisfied with the state of affairs in military-patriotic work. The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan require us to reorganize our activities in this most important area. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that generally good recruits are entering the Army ranks from oblasts of Kazakhstan, there are instances where individual inductees are poorly oriented in the military-political situation and demonstrate complacency and elements of unconcern in assessing it.

It is especially important today in working to improve military-patriotic education of young people to explain broadly the conclusions made by the 27th CPSU Congress on the increased military danger because of international imperialism. "Imperialism," it is emphasized in the Political Report to the CPSU Central Committee Congress, "owing to its social nature, constantly generates an aggressive, adventuristic policy." Pre-military age youth must examine the extremely complex and explosive international situation which has become sharply aggravated, since the United States and its NATO allies are conducting a policy of confrontation, building up the arms race, and rejecting all peace proposals of the Soviet government. The network of universities of the future soldier should be expanded and the quality of classes conducted at them continually increased. An important role in this task belongs to the rayon military commissariats which are called upon to be the initiators in improving military-patriotic work with pre-military age young people and are obliged to bring questions related to this to the attention of local party, soviet, and Komsomol bodies in labor collectives.

Initial military training of senior pupils and students of vocational and technical schools requires a substantial reorganization. Worthy of dissemination are the work forms of Jr Lt (Res) N. Tokmoldayev, military instructor at Secondary School No 1 of Iliyskiy Rayon, Zh. Shayakhmetov, director of Agricultural Vocational Technical School No 6 (Alma-Ata Oblast), and Maj (Res) G. Zagorulko, military instructor at Secondary School No 45 in Alma-Ata. For studies on military training here they have a tactical training area, rifle range, and an obstacle course; meetings with veterans of the war and soldiers of the Army are regularly conducted in the rooms of combat glory.

Many graduates become students of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms School and other military schools. In activities for initial military training at schools of the city of Uralsk they conduct cross-country races and skiing races and also have sections in operation here for military-related types of sports.

At the same time, the training materials base in Mangyshlak and North Kazakhstan oblasts is being improved slowly; students of schools and vocational technical schools in Tselinograd and Turgay oblasts demonstrate a low knowledge of military affairs. They should begin by reviewing the established system of selecting military instructor personnel. Only reserve officers who have a sufficiently thorough knowledge in military affairs and are capable of teaching it to the students should be assigned to these positions. The theoretical and methodological level of military instructors should be raised to a new qualitative level. They need to review the existing practice of assemblies and classes with them, filling them with instructional and methodological measures. Work on improving the training materials base of initial military training must be more urgent.

There is much to be done to improve the work of the republic's DOSAAF. Primarily this involves improving the material base of its training organizations. Is it really permissible, for example, that certain motor vehicle schools do not have well-equipped classrooms for military drivers? That is why their training is often accomplished primitively, as it was many years ago. In a number of oblasts, including Alma-Ata and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts, equipment on which the young people train is maintained in violation of procedures. There are cases of overstating student grades. In a number of instances, their moral qualities are not taken into account during selection for training.

I also would like to mention the physical training of pre-military age young people. Physical training of young people in schools and in production is one of the weakest points in the entire system of military-patriotic work. The formal approach to such an important matter as passing the standards of the "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR" complex must be resolutely rejected. It is time to raise the question seriously of involving pre-military age youth in the section on military-related types of sports.

The question such as work on the military-professional orientation of young people must also be approached in a new manner. Many youths have incorrect ideas about duty as an officer and officer-candidate training. Therefore, after admission some of them do not stand up under the load. Obviously, it is not enough to propagandize only the romantic essence of the officer profession; one must objectively talk about its complexity related to the great strain of Army life.

New forms must also be sought in work to involve war veterans and soldiers who have fulfilled their international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in military-patriotic education of the rising generation. Here stereotype and formalism are unacceptable. The experience amassed in the republic in the course of preparing for and celebrating the 40th anniversary

of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War warrants much attention. This experience is also a tool.

Much freedom has been given local party, Komsomol, and social organizations of the republic in such an important sphere of activities as military-patriotic education of young people. Nothing is more important here than developing the initiative of the masses and intensifying the human factor. The main thing is that the frequent repetition of words about the need for reorganization does not cause them to lose their profound meaning and that the question of intensifying military-patriotic work is not perceived as just another campaign. The republic has amassed a considerable amount of experience of successfully resolving this important task. It should be propagandized and multiplied in every possible way.

Needless to say, we have not exhausted all the issues related to military-patriotic work with young people and to coordinating all our joint efforts in qualitative resolution of this great task. We have many yet-unresolved problems. The main thing is that we need to see them, search for solutions, demonstrate initiative and creativity, get rid of stereotype in thinking and practice, and understand that skillful military-patriotic work is the guarantee of high-quality preparation of youth for service in the Soviet Armed Forces and a weighty contribution to completing the tasks set forth by the 27th CPSU Congress on strengthening the defensive might of our homeland.

Adm Sorokin Article

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, May 86 p 7

[Article by Adm A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Unfading Feat of the People"]

[Text] Victory Day this year has remarkable marks this year. The Soviet people are celebrating it with a sharp change in the life of our country and the modern world as a whole. Today we comprehend the unparalleled military and labor feats and the results and lessons of the war and victory in that special political, businesslike, and moral atmosphere which has been created by the 27th CPSU Congress.

By the start of the last offensive campaign of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War (January 1945), our troops had (less Stavka reserves) 1.9-fold more guns and mortars, 1.5-fold more tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, and 3.6-fold more combat aircraft at the front than the enemy. Most vividly and convincingly, this was the result of the vitality and might of the military organization of the socialist state.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces upheld the liberty and independence of the homeland and the right to life and made a decisive contribution to liberating the peoples of Europe from Nazi bondage and saving world civilization. This is their greatest service to humankind.

Time is inexorable. But our victory is not a thing of the past. Forty-one years ago the Great Patriotic War ended victoriously. In fighting unprecedented in scale and fierceness, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces inflicted a crushing defeat on German fascism. The pain of the losses and the sorrow for those who perished in fighting for the homeland will never subside. The memory of those who, sparing neither strength nor life itself, fought at the front and forged the victory in the rear will remain forever. Contemporaries as well as our descendants in the future will rely on the priceless experience of the Soviet people who did the seemingly impossible under conditions of war. This experience is especially valuable in sudden turns in history and in solving the most difficult and vitally necessary problems.

THE INVINCIBILITY OF SOCIALISM

Our victory is the most convincing evidence that the Soviet people, guided by Lenin's party, are capable of overcoming any obstacles in the path toward the cherished goal--communism and peace.

As we know, the war thrust upon us by the strike forces of imperialism was a severe test of our economy and social system, moral spirit and defensive capabilities of the country, the combat might of the Army, and Soviet military art. We were attacked by a strong, brutal, and crafty enemy. He had on his side surprise of attack and certain miscalculations on our part. The enemy doubled the Soviet military-economic potential. In 1942, in connection with the occupation of the richest economic regions of the country, the aggressor had a three- to fourfold superiority over USSR industrial capabilities.

The real correlation of forces in the first echelons of troops was also in the enemy's favor. His superiority on a number of axes was three- to fourfold, and even greater on the main strike axes.

But the Soviet people and their Army did not waver. The Soviet people did not lose their faith in victory. The country was turned into a single combat camp; more than 1,500 large plants were relocated to the east, and war production was set up there. Making steel and extracting coal at a rate of one-third to one-fourth that of Germany and the countries it occupied, the Soviet people managed to produce nearly twice as many weapons and military equipment.

The homeland of the October Revolution not only remained standing, but changed the course of the war. The fascist hordes were routed at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Leningrad and in the Caucasus, at the Kursk Bulge, on the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Belorussia, and in the Iassi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin operations. The Soviet soldiers raised the red banner above the defeated Reichstag.

Our victory not only demonstrated the great advantages of socialism. It convinced and will convince the Soviet people of the availability of inexhaustible possibilities in a society free from exploitation and oppression. It makes it possible to see with one's own eyes the invincibility

of the Soviet system and the hopelessness of any adventures undertaken to achieve military superiority over the USSR, wear it down with an arms race, and support unpunished aggression.

Today, world socialism is a powerful international formation uniting more than one-third of humankind. The might of socialism is supported by a highly developed economy, a solid scientific base, and reliable military-political potential. The interests of the countries of the socialist community are protected today by a powerful defensive alliance--the Warsaw Treaty Organization. World socialism has always had and will never yield its political, social, and spiritual superiority.

Guided by the experience of the past and the real facts of our reality and taking into account existing capabilities, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev has once again warned that we cannot be worn down by an arms race, cannot be taken from space, and cannot be bypassed in technology. Nothing good will come of these attempts. We will find a convincing response to the "Star Wars" program, and by no means does it have to be in space. Today there is nothing the United States can do that the Soviet Union cannot.

MASSIVE HEROISM

Our victory is directed at the present and the future because it makes it possible to see, in all its many facets, the role and place of the human factor and to understand the vital need for its intensification and growth for accomplishing the great and small deeds and great achievements. The spiritual, organizational, and physical capabilities of the Soviet people put into action during the harsh war years became an invincible force precisely because the party, which had joined the battle and merged with the people, led them to victory.

When everyone had risen to fight the enemy, when men and women, children and old people, workers and collective farmers, intelligentsia and soldiers, all nations and nationalities of the country were unified, when communists were in the first ranks in the most difficult sectors--such a monolith is capable of any task. The strength of this monolith is that it was made up of Soviet people--patriots and internationalists, and that the Communist Party, armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, cemented it.

Only a party expressing the people's basic interests is able to stir the masses for mortal battle with a hated enemy and transform all the people's capabilities into real factors of victory. Life teaches us this. The experience of protecting the achievements of socialism will always attest to this. In the rear and at the front, communists made use of their sole privilege--to be where it is more difficult and be the first to rise to the attack. Four out of five communists were in the troops and at defensive enterprises; 3 million of them gave their lives in battles with the fascist occupiers.

The example of deep ideological conviction, purposefulness, and readiness of communists for self-sacrifice was, is, and will be the most telling argument

of organizing, mobilizing, and educating the masses. The prestige of our party and its powerful magnetic force are in the pure and honest make up of the party member. There is good reason Soviet people considered it a great honor to go with communists into battle. More than 5 million have linked their destiny forever with Lenin's party and joined its ranks.

We see the massive heroism of the Soviet people not only in the many thousands of decorations crowning the feats of the soldiers and toilers of the rear. Hero cities are also evidence of the unparalleled courage. The Soviet working class and people's intelligentsia demonstrated the greatest heroism, steadfastness, and selflessness for the sake of victory. Here is but one example. The 152-mm howitzer proved itself well during the war. This wonderful gun was designed and manufactured in 1943 in only 18 days, and mass production of it was set up in a month and a half.

The two-million-strong people's volunteer corps, the million-strong partisan movement, voluntary collections for the defense fund, and massive blood donations were a demonstration of the highest conscientiousness and ideological conviction of the Soviet people. The Leninist Komsomol and Soviet youth added a vivid page to the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, one that history has never known, one that is impossible in a bourgeois society and an unjust war.

The defeat of fascist Germany and later militaristic Japan became an event of critical and worldwide historical importance and opened to the peoples of the planet new paths of social progress and the prospect of a just and lasting peace on earth. "The victory of the Soviet people," the new wording of the CPSU Program states, "raised high the international prestige of the Soviet state."

Under the influence of our victory and the conditions it created, the political makeup of the planet changed substantially. A world system of socialism emerged and became a mighty moral and material force. More than 100 sovereign states embarking on the path of independent historical creative activity exist today in place of the collapsed colonial empires. A mighty potential of the world has sprung up and is growing stronger.

As we know, the severe trials of the Soviet people did not end with the spring of 1945. The war hampered our development for more than 10 years. The national wealth of the country was reduced by nearly one-third.

Under the leadership of the party, the Soviet people, exhausted by the war but infinitely happy with its victorious finish, once again proved to the world their ability to work heroically as they did during the war, but without war. In a short time the economic system was reorganized on a peacetime footing and the economy destroyed by the war was restored. In 1948 the industrial output in the USSR reached the pre-war level. This was yet another victory. The miracles of labor heroism matched the military feat.

The victory in the war and the successes during the initial postwar years strengthened our multinational nation even more and were a sort of launching pad for new outstanding achievements. Among these achievements we rightfully

include the elimination of the U.S. atomic monopoly, which ended in tragedy for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and enormous gains in economics, culture, the social sphere, and bringing up a generation of builders of a new society. The USSR opened the way to space for humankind and ensured military-strategic parity, which substantially limited the aggressive plans and opportunities of imperialism to unleash a nuclear war.

LESSONS OF HISTORY

The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism and the course of postwar development confirmed with special force the prophetic words of Lenin that war against us means for those who organize and inspire it a worsening of conditions they could have had without war and before the war. It has been this way more than once. It will be this way in the future as well. Our victory teaches this to everyone who treats its experience soberly and does not strive to falsify the facts.

The principal thing that the war which took more than 20 million Soviet lives teaches is that one must fight against war before it begins. This lesson is especially valuable today when the question is being decided: Will there be a civilization or will the plan burn up in a nuclear fire?

The cohesive, coordinated, and aggressive actions of all peaceloving forces against the aggressive, adventuristic policy of reactionary imperialist circles ignoring the fate of past aspirants of world domination are needed to uphold peace.

The war and the victory gave us a serious and still-valid lesson in vigilance and readiness to defeat any aggressor. The importance of the enemy, his intentions and real actions, the ability not to allow him to catch us unawares, and to always be in a position to foil his treacherous schemes determined the success of each operation and battle. Conversely, the loss of vigilance and poor preparation are always fraught with serious consequences and entail unjustified casualties.

Today, when the reactionary forces of imperialism, especially the American military industrial complex, are preparing a new world war, brazenly provoking armed conflicts (violation of our border in the Black Sea and bandit air raids on the territory of sovereign Libya), looking for any reason to hamper improvement of the world situation, and openly defying not only the USSR and the countries of socialism but all of humankind, questions of vigilance and combat readiness have taken on special acuteness. Understanding this acuteness, our party states: We will not allow ourselves to be caught unawares. The Soviet state is able to respond to any challenge. If necessary, it will respond to this one too. The USSR does not lay claim to greater security and will not stand for less security.

"The Soviet Army and Navy," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report states, "have at their disposal modern weapons and equipment and have well-trained personnel and command and political cadres trained and selflessly devoted to the people. They perform their duty in a worthy manner in a most

complex and at times grim situation. Our defensive might enables us to protect peaceful labor and the peaceful life of the Soviet people reliably.

Fighting men of the Army and Navy, as well as all Soviet people, greet Victory Day with an awareness that successful fulfillment of our plans and program, deceleration of social and economic development, and reorganization of all spheres of our life, outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress, not only will make it possible to achieve a new qualitative state of Soviet society, but will also multiply our defensive capabilities.

Soviet soldiers will always be faithful to the glorious traditions of those who, locked in mortal combat, upheld the liberty and independence of the homeland and will in the future vigilantly stand guard over the great achievements of socialism and honorably carry out their patriotic and international duty.

12567

CSO: 1801/188

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

CRITICISM OF 'U.S. MILITARIZATION' OF INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 86 p 3

[Article by V. Cherepakhin under rubric "Military Danger Centers": "Pentagon Intrigues in the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] Professor R. (Paone), a strategist of American imperialism, expressed the plans of U.S. militarist circles in the Indian Ocean basin clearly and unambiguously: "The one who succeeds in establishing supremacy in the Indian Ocean area will control the new global center of strength and play a predominant role in the formation of world politics."

The desire for supremacy in the Indian Ocean basin, and in the Persian Gulf above all, has been seen especially clearly in American strategists since the 1970's, when Washington set a course toward direct military expansion in this region. The Pentagon declared this area of the planet a "third strategic zone" after Western Europe and the Far East.

Without adducing any proof, the White House tried to substantiate a build-up of the American military presence in the Indian Ocean with the far-fetched need to "defend" notorious "vital interests." But here is what Indian publicist B. N. Banerjee wrote in his book "The Indian Ocean: Abyss of Tension" about Washington's true hegemonic goals: "Just what 'vital interests' can the United States have in the Indian Ocean, thousands of miles from American borders? Above all the United States is trying to establish its military and strategic supremacy over the Indian Ocean in general and over the Persian Gulf in particular to keep the region's independent states under its scrutiny and control them by force or the threat of force."

It is common knowledge that enormous reserves of strategic raw materials are concentrated in the Indian Ocean basin: over 30 percent of the oil, 81 percent of world gold production, 90 percent of rubber, 57 percent of tin, 40 percent of antimony, 28 percent of manganese and so on. This region accounts for almost one-fourth of all maritime freight shipments, and more than 50,000 vessels ply the Indian Ocean's waters each year. The Pentagon also is building up its militarist fist here to protect the selfish interests of American national and transnational corporations attempting to appropriate the cheap raw materials once and for all and exploit the labor force, which is just as cheap.

The Pentagon's plans place priority emphasis on the Indian Ocean basin. Over \$30 billion have been spent on military purposes in this part of the planet in the last five years. The Pentagon has created a powerful springboard for forward based forces in the Indian Ocean, with its basis being some 30 military bases and support points deployed from the east coast of Africa to Australia. Washington keeps a significant ship grouping there, usually including aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers, nuclear powered submarines and other combatant ships. The White House is allocating billions to establish the Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Working together with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, this fleet would intensify the threat to the entire Eurasian continent.

Units of the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF], which already have some 300,000 persons, hold a special place in the structure of the U.S. military grouping in this region. These interventionist forces are subordinate to the so-called Central Command (CENTCOM), whose sphere of operation includes the territories of 19 sovereign states of Asia, Africa and the Near East. A program has been worked out for building up and improving the RDF through 1987.

U.S. Vice President G. Bush and Assistant Secretary of State R. Murphy now are on a trip through Persian Gulf countries. Their goal is to use any excuse, particularly the Iran-Iraq war, to intervene in the affairs of Gulf countries. Bush, for example, again advanced the idea of "escorting" tankers with warships of the United States and its NATO allies. As the telegraph agencies transmit, however, he was given to understand in El Riyadh that "such a presence will only complicate the situation."

Washington also is connecting its NATO allies, especially England and France, to the militarization of the Indian Ocean. A British naval grouping of destroyers, frigates and auxiliary vessels and an 8-9ship force of the French Navy already are located here on a permanent basis.

Diego Garcia Island, situated almost in the center of the Indian Ocean, has been turned into the main naval and air force base. A runway was built there capable of receiving B-52 and B-1B strategic bombers and large KC-135 tanker aircraft. Berths for aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines, fuel and ammunition depots, storage facilities for nuclear and chemical weapons, and a communications and communications intelligence center have been built.

According to foreign press reports, the Pentagon plans to adapt Diego Garcia to wage "star wars." An electro-optical station for monitoring near space is being built at the base. Submarines based at Diego Garcia are being fitted with vertical launch systems for missiles with nuclear warheads and with special explosive devices which, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, can be considered one of the "star wars" components. The press has reported the Pentagon's intention to use American centers for controlling, tracking and receiving data from military satellites located on Mahe Island (in the Seychelles) and at Alice Springs, Australia for implementing the "star wars" program.

Observers direct attention to Washington's attempt to "tie" the Zia-ul-Haq regime in Pakistan to American plans for military-strategic development of the Indian Ocean. American electronic tracking stations are being set up on Pakistani territory at Sargodha, Gwadar, Peshawar and Karachi for monitoring a considerable water area of the Indian Ocean and the territory of India, Afghanistan and other states of the region. The Pentagon is trying to obtain the right to use ports and airfields at Gwadar, Peshawar and Karachi and to locate a regional CENTCOM headquarters in Pakistan. Evidence of this also was the recent call at the port of Karachi by U.S. Seventh Fleet warships headed by the nuclear carrier "Enterprise."

Washington's militarization of the Indian Ocean contradicts the interests of the overwhelming majority of states located in its zone and creates a threat to peace and security in the region. For 15 years now the peoples of these countries have been struggling to implement the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. A special UN commission on the Indian Ocean repeatedly set deadlines for convening such a conference, but not one of these deadlines held up. There also will be no conference in 1986, although everything in fact was ready for it. The United States yet again disrupted the planned international forum under the far-fetched pretext that it was predoomed to failure.

But American "diplomacy" suffered a serious defeat at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly in late 1985. The General Assembly adopted a resolution in which the Special Committee was charged with completing preparatory work in 1986 to convene a conference and to hold it at the earliest possible time, but no later than 1988.

The Soviet Union holds a precise and clear position on this matter. M. S. Gorbachev stated in an interview with the Indian agency PRESS TRUST OF INDIA: "The pivot of the struggle for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean now has become the question of convening an international conference on this issue." The Soviet leader emphasized the need for all states whose ships use waters of the Indian Ocean basin to refrain from any steps capable of complicating the situation in this region before the conference convenes. This means not sending large naval forces there, not holding military exercises, and not expanding or modernizing military bases of those coastal states which have such bases. All this unquestionably would promote a strengthening of security of the region's countries and normalization of the international situation as a whole.

6904
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

DATA ON NEW U.S. SSN EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 86 p 3

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Kiselev under the rubric "Behind the Scene in the Arms Race": "A New Underwater Monster"]

[Text] "A powerful navy is the most reliable tool for achieving foreign policy goals"--such was the dominant theme of a report, "Naval Strategy," delivered at the beginning of this year. It was written by U.S. Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Watkins. The end justifies the means, as they say. This is evidenced by the fact that budget allocations for the Navy considerably exceed allocations for the other branches of the U.S. armed forces. Today, Washington is spending approximately 40 percent of the entire military budget on the Navy. The lion's share of this goes for nuclear submarines. Under the "forward line" doctrine they are present in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The oversea strategists assign a special role to multipurpose nuclear submarines. According to the views of Western specialists, the basic missions which these boats should perform include destroying enemy submarines and surface ships, disrupting the enemy's ocean and sea lines of communication, providing ASW security for aircraft carriers, conducting reconnaissance and supporting naval forces in diverse naval operations.

Assessing the design features of existing nuclear submarines--of the Los Angeles class, for example--foreign military experts stress the fact that they have already completely exhausted their possibilities for modernization and that they will not meet the demands made of them in 10-15 years. Fundamentally new versions are needed.

No problem: the military-industrial complex is prepared to fill any order. And the client, as usual, has ready "justification." This is the "Soviet military threat," the U.S. naval strategists say, and the acute need stemming from it to enhance the combat effectiveness of the submarines. It primarily involves improving their technical specifications, outfitting them with new weapon systems and so forth. In addition to modernizing existing submarines, attempts are being made to look far ahead. An example of this is the design for a new nuclear submarine code-named the SSN 21.

The American magazine NAVY INTERNATIONAL reports that this submarine "represents a drastic improvement in such features as speed and armament with new combat weapon systems." It is also assumed that the submarine will be somewhat less noisy than existing ones. It is planned to achieve this with a large number of design innovations in the submarine assemblies and by using special hull coverings. The propeller design will be new, for example. The number of blades will be increased, and they will be housed in a special noise-suppressing shroud. A great deal of attention is being given to increasing the future submarine's tactical speed. It is hoped that this will reach 34-36 knots.

The foreign experts state that the hull is being made of HY-100 steel, which will make it possible to increase the submersion depth and will "facilitate the performance of missions in areas with a complex ice situation." This means sailing in the Arctic latitudes.

With respect to armament, more than enough suggestions are coming in. There are reports of new types of torpedo tubes up to 750mm in diameter. It is planned to increase the torpedo load to 50 units and to equip the SSN 21 with new types of mines and other antiship and ASW weapons.

A great deal of debate has developed around the nuclear reactor, the heart of the future underwater monster. And although the debate is still far from over, opinions are being expressed that the power on the main power plant shaft should be at least 48,000-56,000hp. In order to increase the capacity of the combat weapon systems it is anticipated that the size of the turbine compartment, coupled with the reactor compartment, will be reduced by 40 percent below that of contemporary submarines.

The projected length of the submarine is more than 100 meters; it will have a submerged displacement of 9,150-9,850 tons and will carry a crew of 133. It is planned to begin the main projects involved in designing the new submarine in 1989 and to place it into operation in 1995.

According to U.S. Navy Secretary J. Lehman, the approximate cost of the SSN 21 prototype will be 1.6 billion dollars, that of the series-produced submarine 1 billion. However, certain officials in the Defense Department are already saying that this figure may be considerably larger. So there will also be a profit for the weapons producers. In the future, the foreign press reports, the Pentagon plans to build at least 30 submarines of this design.

Smelling the possibility of profits, the largest shipbuilding corporations in the United States have rushed in to content for "orders." Two well-known corporations, General Dynamics and Newport News Shipbuilding, were the first to enter the fight. This is only the beginning, however. Time will tell who will get the main profits. Only one thing is clear at the present time: the ordinary taxpayer will have to pay for all of this.

11499
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. INCREASING NUMBER OF WARPLANES IN NORWAY

LD122222 Moscow TASS in English 2120 GMT 12 Jun 86

[Text] Oslo June 12 TASS -- TASS correspondent Stanislav Tikhomirov reports:

The United States is increasing the number of warplanes to be sent to Norway in the event of so-called "crisis situation" and regularly trains the personnel of its airforce in Norway's conditions.

According to a report of the Norwegian Telegraphic Bureau, an unusual activity is now observed at Anneia Air Base in Northern Norway and the air space over it. A squadron of F-4C fighter bombers consisting of 12 aircraft and 500 servicemen, arrived at the base from Indiana, the USA. The flights will last till June 23 and then the U.S. aircraft will be used in the military exercises in the Troms Province.

The United States' and NATO's aggressive preparations on Norway's territory evoke sharp protest of the Norwegian public. It is particularly concerned over the fact that U.S. planes meant for operations in Norway might be equipped with nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 1812/135

AFGHANISTAN

HEROISM OF YOUNG SOLDIERS IN DRA RECOUNTED

Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Apr 86 p 3

[Article by V. Gladilov, TASS correspondent, Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in DRA, under the rubric "Place of Duty--Afghanistan": "A Time of Maturation"]

[Text] The maturing of 18- and 19-year-old boys who have donned the soldier's overcoat sometimes takes place not under "conditions approaching combat conditions" but under actual combat conditions. They serve in Afghanistan, a republic against which an undeclared war has been waged for several years now. And Soviet fightingmen, loyal to their international duty, set examples of courage and heroism as they help their comrades in arms to stand fast.

The First Battle and... Also Difficult

Private Aleksandr Kupreyev looked at his comrades with pride. Many of them had state awards and military decorations. If a battle should occur, would he be able to perform as their equal?

And now the company was returning from mountain training exercises. The tired soldiers and officers were already anticipating the rest, when suddenly an explosion sounded ahead of them, where the combat security group was located.

The forward patrol determined that a band had taken up a position on the slope of a hill and that it would be dangerous to attack it from the front. Ordering the cover group to continue firing, the subunit commander took the platoon, the one in which Aleksandr Kupreyev serves, through a barely noticeable crevice to the top of the ridge. The soldier moved swiftly and skilfully upward. He was also the first to notice a carefully camouflaged group of dushmani.

Senior Lieutenant V. Golubev, platoon commander, decided to attack this group and then destroy the ambush.

Private A. Kupreyev distinguished himself again in the battle. He instantly responded with submachine-gun fire to attempts by the dushmani to shell the Soviet fighters.

A Medal for a Young Soldier

The "For Valor" medal has been awarded to Guards Private Igor Kobzey. He is a young soldier, but he has already distinguished himself in battle.

The subunit in which Igor serves as gunner on an infantry combat vehicle was escorting a column of Afghan trucks hauling food and warm clothing to remote mountain villages. Three vehicles had passed over the narrow ruts, but a mine exploded beneath the fourth.

At that same moment the slopes of the hills resounded with machine-gun and submachine-gun fire. The stunned truck drivers began leaping out right into the line of fire. The commander of the escort group ordered Kobzey to cover.

The infantry combat vehicle rushed forward to overtake the column, and gunner I. Kobzey fired at the barely perceptible flashes, preventing the dushmani from conducting aimed fire. At that time the fightingmen poured out of the other infantry combat vehicles and swiftly attacked.

The dushman band was destroyed.

The Courage of an NCOIC of a Medical Party

Private Askhat Raimkulov, NCOIC of a medical party, was operating with Afghan comrades in a battle to destroy a large band of dushmani.

It took Askhat several minutes to set up the tent with the red star. During that time machine-gun and submachine-gun fire could be heard, and the explosion of grenades resounded in the subunit's battle formations. This meant that it was time to get busy. Askhat rushed toward the battle site. He was met by the commander, who pointed to the other side of a large boulder. A seriously wounded Afghan soldier lay there. Raimkulov dressed his wounds and looked out from behind the rock to figure out how to get the wounded man out as rapidly as possible. In front of him was a low rocky ridge. Askhat rushed to the ridge. He then headed for the tent, no longer bothering to conceal himself. Suddenly, with some sort of side vision, the soldier detected several dushmani busy setting up a large-caliber machine-gun slightly higher up on the slope. The bandits had reached the rear of the Afghan subunit and were now preparing to open fire.

There was a long burst of fire. It was Private A. Raimkulov. He had entered the battle without a moment's thought. He then delivered the wounded man to the tent and soon after that he dragged in the machine-gun taken from the dushmani.

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AFGHANISTAN

PILOT OF DOWNED AIRCRAFT RECEIVES BRAVERY AWARD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 86 p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Shurkhovetskiy: "An Occurrence During Reconnaissance: Just One Episode"]

[Text] "Get up, Petrovich! Today we are celebrating!" Captain Sergey Sokolov said, stretching out his arms as though he intended to lift me from the hospital bed. I had completely regained consciousness following the operation and for a minute I looked at the visitors with bewilderment. Two days earlier all of them had worn the same hospital garments I was wearing. Sergey had most frequently appeared in the hall with a crutch, but today he had entered my ward in uniform and without even a cane.

"Petrovich, why are you looking at us as though we have fallen from the sky? We have just come from a formal meeting at which Sergey was awarded an order!"

Not until he had said this did I notice the Order of the Red Star sparkling like a ruby from Sokolov's uniform jacket.

"Why didn't you tell me before?" I asked and extended my hand to Sergey. I could not say any more. I was all choked up.

...While fulfilling his international duty in the DRA, Sokolov had been given an assignment to fly to area "X" and conduct reconnaissance there. He encountered dushman ambushes near the caravan trail. The pilot rapidly gained altitude and headed toward the mountains. Upon reaching the assigned area, he descended. At one place he noticed suspicious movements by a group of people. And then the unexpected happened.

Sokolov felt the fighter shudder, refusing to respond to control, and begin to dive. He was forced to eject. At the hospital he learned from his comrades that a dushman missile had shot out from the rocks, intersecting his flight path, and struck his combat aircraft.

After ejecting, Sergey did not hear the usual report of a parachute opening. The ground began rushing toward him. Just at a certain moment he noticed that it was approaching somewhat strangely: on the one hand it appeared to be very near, and on the other it seemed somewhat farther away. He did not feel the blow. He was only aware somewhere in his subconsciousness that he was rolling down the mountain as though in an iron barrel.

When Sokolov came to, he discovered that he was lying on a fairly flat area. He could see a steep slope above. Rocks continued to rain down upon him. "I am lucky!" Sergey thought to himself and tried to get up. He felt the stab of a sharp pain in his chest, however. He cautiously turned onto his side and tried to unfasten the parachute pack, which was now hampering him. He succeeded, but shots rang out and bullets began popping around him just when he was attempting to free himself of the harness. Sand and pieces of rock spattered his face. Sergey froze and then began cautiously looking around. He spotted several turbaned heads at the top of the slope.

"They're surrounding me!" the thought pierced him. There was no time to think. He unsnapped his submachine gun, inserted a magazine and peppered the dushmani with a round.

The heads disappeared behind the rocks. Overcoming the pain in his chest, Sergey made his way nearer to the foot of the slope from where he had rolled a few minutes before. Once again, he was fired upon with submachine guns. Now they were shooting from the direction of the level area. Bullets fell in a sheaf around the pilot, but fortunately none of them touched him.

Now Sokolov was firing alternately upward and downward. When the pain in his chest subsided a bit, he would thrust his body to the side and fire again, preventing the bandits from approaching. He knew that he could not hold out long: his ammunition was running out. The breech mechanism on the submachine gun clattered one last time and fell silent. The dushmani shots also ceased. Their heads flashed now here, now there, from behind the rocks on the level area.

Sergey was lying on his stomach, clasping his submachine gun to his body. He had only one magazine left. In order to reach it, however, he would at least have to turn onto his side. This meant that he would have to stir and attract fire once again. There was no other way, however: if the dushmani crawled closer, it would be too late. And Sergey took the chance: he turned over with a lurch, jerked out the magazine and gritted his teeth from the onset of a new pain which seared his left thigh. Those on top were apparently keeping him in their sight and watching for any movement on his part.

"You hit me, you snakes!" flashed through his mind. He succeeded in inserting the magazine, however, and struck at the enemy once again.

"You're not shooting at my head. You want to take me alive!" Sergey whispered through his parched lips. "We'll see about that!..."

He had fewer and fewer bullets, finally reaching that last one. Sokolov had calculated precisely.

Sergey did not notice the arrival of our helicopters. They made one circle over the open area and then another. The dushmani were absorbed in their "hunt" for the wounded pilot and did not leave, however. From the air the helicopter pilots could clearly see them encircle the fighting Sokolov. The rotary-wing aircraft then went into action....

There were hospitals. One of them is where I met Sokolov and learned about his decoration.

Sergey faced one more major operation. I knew that he was anxious to get it over with, since his hopes of returning to the winged formation, to the skies which had become dear to him for life, would only become a reality after it had been performed.

I recently learned with joy that Captain Sokolov is continuing to serve in air unit "X."

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END